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CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE CHURCH OF
THE TWELVE STEPS
George J. Barry*
INTRODUCTION
Every state in the nation, as well as the U.S. territories of
Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, currently recognizes a
need to protect the confidential communications between a person
and his or her spiritual advisor.1 With no basis in state common
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Florida, 2000. The author would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Law
and Policy. He would also like to thank his family, especially his wife Tracy,
for their love and support.
1
State statutes designating specific religious leaders to whom the
religious privilege applies seem unavailing in light of courts’ expanding view
of the type of organizations that qualify as a religion or a religious
organization. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d
1068, 1075 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that Alcoholics Anonymous is a religious
organization for the purpose of applying the Establishment Clause). The
variations range from the vague, “[a] member of the clergy or other minister
of any religion,” MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (2001), to the exclusive, “any
Protestant minister of the Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, any
priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic faith, any Jewish rabbi, or to any
Christian or Jewish minister,” GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2001), to the
commendable, but laughable, “minister of the gospel, priest of the Catholic
Church, rector of the Episcopal Church, ordained rabbi, or regular minister of
religion of any religious organization or denomination usually referred to as a
church,” TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (2001).
The term “spiritual advisor” is commonly used in the privilege statutes to
describe the job of the sacerdotal functionaries of the various religions. See
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001). For example, the New York statute
states, “Unless the person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a
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law,2 this recognition has assumed statutory form,3 creating what
clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited Christian
Science practitioner, shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or
confidence made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor.” Id.
(emphasis added). This note, therefore, adopts the term “spiritual advisor” to
be used interchangeably with “clergy” to represent the person performing a
particular spiritual service within the context of a religious organization that
recognizes that person as one capable of performing such services.
2
See, e.g., Keenan v. Gigante, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (N.Y. 1979)
(noting that the privilege did not exist at common law and holding that
communications between a prisoner and a priest are not protected by statutory
privilege when the testimony of the priest would not “jeopardize the
atmosphere of confidence and trust which allegedly enveloped the
relationship” between the priest and the communicant); Claudia G. Catalano,
Annotation, Subject Matter and Waiver of Privilege Covering Communications
to Clergy Member or Spiritual Adviser, 93 A.L.R.5th 327 (2001) (noting that
state courts have unanimously acknowledged that the religious privilege did
not exist at common law).
3
ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (2001); ALASKA R. EVID. 506 (Michie 2001);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2233 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie
2001); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1033 (providing privilege to penitent) (Deering
2001), 1034 (providing privilege to clergy) (Deering 2001); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-107 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (2001); DEL. R.
EVID. 505 (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 90.505 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22
(2001); 6 GUAM CODE ANN. § 503 (2001); HAW. R. EVID. 506 (2001); IDAHO
CODE § 9-203 (Michie 2001); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2001); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-46-3-1 (Michie 2001); IOWA CODE § 622.10 (2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (2001); KY. R. EVID. 505 (Michie 2001); LA. CODE
EVID. ANN. art. 511 (West 2001); ME. R. EVID. 505 (West 2001); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,
§ 20A (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2156 (2001); MINN. STAT. §
595.02 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (2001); MO. REV. STAT. §
491.060 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506
(2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 516:35 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West 2001); N.M. R.
EVID. § 11-506 (Michie 2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (2001); N.D. R. EVID. 505 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2505 (2001); OR.
REV. STAT. § 40.260 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. § 5943 (2001); P.R. R. EVID.
28 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90
(Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-17 (Michie 2001); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (2001); TEX. EVID. CODE ANN. § 505 (2001); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (2001); VT. R. EVID. 505 (2001); 4 V.I. CODE ANN. §
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is commonly referred to as the “priest-penitent,”4 “clergypenitent,”5 or simply “religious”6 privilege. The federal
government also recognizes a religious privilege. Declining to
codify the privilege explicitly,7 Congress instead adopted Federal
857 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE §
5.60.060 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (2001); WIS. STAT. § 905.06 (2001);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101 (Michie 2001).
4
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-266 (2001).
5
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 622.10 (2001).
6
See, e.g., DEL. R. EVID. 505 (2001).
7
The Supreme Court proposed a statutory privilege to Congress as
Federal Rule of Evidence 506, which failed to pass. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 26 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5611 (1992). The rule stated the following:
a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A “clergyman” is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar
functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably
believed so to be by the person consulting him.
(2) A communication is “confidential” if made privately and not
intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in
furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential
communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional
character as spiritual adviser.
c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal
representative if he is deceased. The clergyman may claim the
privilege on behalf of the person. His authority so to do is presumed
in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SUPREME COURT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT, HR 5463 JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT, AND
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 84
(John R. Schmertz, Jr., ed., 1974) [hereinafter PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE]. When proposed Rule 506 was before Congress for a vote, it
foundered without much debate; however, while in the drafting stages,
Arkansas Senator John L. McClellan (D) submitted a letter objecting to the
proposed rule’s broad definition of clergyman. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra, §
5611. In response to his objections, which are thought by some to have been
motivated by racism, the advisory committee altered the language of its note
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Rule of Evidence 501, which enables the federal judiciary to
create evidentiary privileges “in the light of reason and
experience.”8 Although Rule 501 prompted expeditious
development of a religious privilege,9 the federal judiciary had

following the text of the rule to narrow the application of the privilege. Id.
The note reads in pertinent part:
[I]t is not so broad as to include all self-denominated “ministers.” A
fair construction of the language requires that the person to whom the
status is sought to be attached be regularly engaged in activities
conforming at least in a general way with those of a Catholic priest,
Jewish rabbi, or minister of an established Protestant denomination,
though not necessarily on a full-time basis.
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra, at 84-85; see also In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 n.13 (adopting rejected Rule
506’s definition of clergy and limiting the privilege in a similar fashion).
Ultimately, Congress rejected Rule 506, along with seven other specific
evidentiary privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, psychotherapistpatient privilege, and “husband-wife” privilege, and three general rules
proposed by the Court. See generally PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, supra.
8
FED. R. EVID. 501 (2002). Rule 501, enacted in 1974, states the
following:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
9
United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1973) (interpreting
proposed Rule 506 to determine that a member of the clergy must be a natural
person and not a corporation); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D.
Cal. 1971) (determining that non-ordained counselors, recruited by a minister
who was ordained by the United Presbyterian Church and was employed to
counsel students about the Vietnam War draft, fell within the definition of
clergy under proposed Rule 506).
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already recognized the privilege, or a variation thereof, long
before Congress had addressed the issue.10
Of the various evidentiary privileges in existence (e.g.,
attorney-client, doctor-patient, and psychotherapist-patient), the
religious privilege has been the least controversial and most
widely accepted.11 Nevertheless, the privilege has not been
entirely free from controversy, and it has evolved through the
relatively sparse caselaw on both the state and federal levels to
protect communications meeting three general requirements:12 (1)
the person communicating with her spiritual advisor must do so
with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality;13 (2) the spiritual
advisor must be, or reasonably be thought by the communicant to
10

See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (stating that
public policy would not permit at trial the disclosure of the “confidences of the
confessional”); McMann v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.
1937) (recognizing “penitential” communications as privileged).
11
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 381 (“The
history of the proposed Rules of Evidence reflects that the clergy-communicant
rule was one of the least controversial of the enumerated privileges, merely
defining a long-recognized principle of American law.”); JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, 5 A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2396 (2d ed. 1923) (noting that Jeremy Bentham,
“the greatest opponent of privileges,” supported the religious privilege).
12
Some opinions have recognized a fourth requirement, that the
communication be penitential or confessional in nature, as may be required by
the ecclesiastical doctrine of a particular religion. See, e.g., People v.
Edwards, 248 Cal. Rptr. 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that confidential
communication between criminal defendant and Episcopalian priest was not
privileged when not of a penitential nature); State v. Buss, 887 P.2d 920
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (“Washington’s statutory privilege only applies if
Buss’ statements were a confession in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church.” (internal citations and ellipsis omitted)). This requirement is largely
rejected by more recent decisions; courts have expanded the privilege to apply
broadly to communication reasonably expected to remain confidential. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 386 (noting that the religious
privilege has evolved from protecting private confessions to encompassing a
wide range of communications with clergy); State v. Martin, 975 P.2d 1020
(Wash. 1999) (abrogating Buss, 887 P.2d 920).
13
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 386 (holding that the
presence of a third party does not defeat the reasonable expectation of privacy
when the third party is necessary for the furtherance of the communication).
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be,14 a member of the clergy;15 and (3) the spiritual advisor must
be acting in his or her professional capacity.16
Courts have addressed, though not fully answered, questions
regarding each of these requirements.17 The least litigated issue is
what qualifications are necessary to be considered a spiritual
advisor as required by state statutes and federal courts.18 In most
cases, a person’s status as spiritual advisor is assumed.19 This
assumption likely stems from a common understanding that most
people claiming the privilege are attempting to protect
information revealed to recognized leaders of widely accepted
religions.20 Thus, courts need only address this issue when the
14

Most statutes granting the religious privilege protect communicants
who may have been misled into believing the person with whom they were
communicating was a spiritual advisor to whom the privilege applied. See,
e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Michie 2001); N.M. R. EVID. § 11-506 (Michie
2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001).
15
See In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (invoking
the religious privilege to protect speech between college students and
counselors providing spiritual counseling during the Vietnam War draft when
the counselors had been appointed by an ordained minister of the United
Presbyterian Church working as a college chaplain).
16
See United States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 822, 823 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding communication with a priest acting in the capacity of a member of a
corporation’s board of directors not privileged); State v. Barber, 346 S.E.2d
441, 445 (N.C. 1986) (finding that a de facto clergyman was not acting in
professional capacity during a casual conversation with a friend).
17
See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374
(determining whether communication with a clergy member was confidential
when in the presence of a third party); see also Gordon, 493 F. Supp. at 823
(holding that a priest was not acting in his “spiritual capacity” when discussing
business matters with the defendant); In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. at 436
(noting that, while ordination might not be required for a person to qualify as
a clergy member, “the person to whom the status is sought to be attached
[must] be regularly engaged in activities conforming at least in a general way
with those of . . . an established Protestant denomination, though not
necessarily on a full-time basis”) (citing proposed Rule 506 advisory
committee’s note).
18
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5613.
19
Id.
20
Despite the recognition and acceptance of numerous religions within
the United States, the majority of statutes creating the religious privilege
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status of the spiritual advisor is tenuous at best.21
In Cox v. Miller,22 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York squarely addressed the issue of
who qualifies as a spiritual advisor.23 The court found that New
York’s religious privilege shields communications within the selfhelp setting of Alcoholics Anonymous (“A.A.”),24 and its
reasoning will likely protect communication within numerous
organizations adopting A.A.’s hugely successful “Twelve Steps”
to recovery.25 In its opinion, the court explicitly determined that
A.A. members are spiritual advisors as that term is used and
identify spiritual advisors as “clergy” or “clergymen” and limit their explicit
definition of those terms to ministers, priests, and rabbis. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-41-101 (Michie 2001). This note assumes the lists of
statutorily denoted religious leaders are not exhaustive. The few cases
discussing the issue support such an assumption. Compare Reutkemeier v.
Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 293 (Iowa 1917) (holding that elders of a Presbyterian
church constituted clergy), with Rutledge v. State, 525 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind.
1988) (holding that a member of the Gideons, a religious organization of
business people who hand out free Bibles, who was teaching prisoners about
the Bible was not clergy). Furthermore, this note proposes to expose the
privilege’s limitations when a person’s status as a spiritual advisor is suspect.
21
See, e.g., Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72-73 (E.D. Mo.
1985) (holding that a nun who was recognized by the Catholic Church as
holding the position of “spiritual director” was clergy for privilege purposes);
Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a
psychic was not a clergy member regardless of any self-characterization as a
spiritual advisor); State v. Alspach, 524 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 1994)
(holding that the defendant failed to prove his brother was a member of the
clergy despite his view that his brother was a spiritual advisor); Rutledge, 525
N.E.2d at 328 (holding that a member of the Gideons was not clergy).
22
154 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
23
See infra Part I.C (discussing Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787).
24
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001).
25
According to the most recent information released by A.A., as of Jan.
1, 2002, its membership comprised 100,766 groups containing a total of more
than 2,000,000 individuals, with approximately 1,162,112 members in the
United States. Alcoholics Anonymous, Membership, at http://www.alcoholicsanonymous.org/english/E_FactFile/M-24_d4.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002).
A.A. acknowledges that the strictures of anonymity and the general lack of
formal organization complicate attempts to maintain accurate statistical
records. Id.
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defined in the statute.26 In so doing, the court extended both the
New York statutory privilege and the federal common law
privilege beyond what “the light of reason and experience”27
could ever possibly have revealed.
Part I of this note includes a discussion of the formation of
A.A. and the judicial recognition of A.A. as a religious
organization.28 In addition, Part I briefly introduces the Cox
decision.29 Part II explores the Cox reasoning in depth, revealing
the factual and legal flaws pervading the court’s decision. These
flaws help bring to light two primary reasons why the religious
privilege, absent legislative approval, has no place in the A.A.
setting: (1) despite its designation as a religious organization,
A.A. does not fit within the framework of the religious privilege;
and (2) public policy cannot endorse a judiciary willing to put the
addiction recovery interests of a criminal confessor above those
of his or her fellow recovering confidant. Part III addresses the
concerns of the critics who support expanding the religious
privilege to encompass A.A. and demonstrates that their
arguments are replete with speculation and unsupported by

26

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001).
FED. R. EVID. 501 (2001).
28
Currently, the Second and Seventh Circuits are the only federal circuits
to have recognized A.A. or groups adopting A.A.’s principles as religious
organizations for the purpose of determining whether the Establishment Clause
permits the government to compel attendance at those organizations’ meetings.
See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussed infra Part I.B); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that Narcotics Anonymous is a religious organization). The issue,
therefore, is far from settled and beyond the scope of this note. Nevertheless,
the author accepts the Second and Seventh Circuits’ conclusion, which has
been welcomed by some commentators. See, e.g., Derek P. Apanovitch,
Note, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by the State, 47
DUKE L.J. 785 (1998) (discussing the various religious aspects of A.A.);
Rachel F. Calabro, Note, Correction Through Coercion: Do State Mandated
Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment
Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 565 (1998) (arguing that A.A.’s adoption of
traditional religious concepts qualifies the organization for Establishment
Clause protection).
29
Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
27
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science.30 This note concludes that protecting communication
within A.A. by expanding religious privileges, an extreme
solution for a virtually non-existent problem, is unnecessary in
light of the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause of
the United States Constitution.31
I.

ESTABLISHING THE CHURCH OF THE RECOVERING ALCOHOLIC

A.A. takes no official position on public issues.32 Despite
being the subject of several court opinions, A.A. has adhered to
this principle and has refrained from issuing an official statement
challenging or praising the judicial portrayals or the
consequences arising therefrom.33 In order to understand A.A., it
is, therefore, necessary to explore the history and principles
guiding the development and survival of what is arguably the
world’s largest self-help organization.34 Following a discussion of
30

See generally Thomas J. Reed, The Futile Fifth Step: Compulsory
Disclosure of Confidential Communications Among Alcoholics Anonymous
Members, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693 (discussing various rationales, including
the expansion of the religious privilege, for protecting confidential speech
within A.A.); Jessica G. Weiner, Comment, “And the Wisdom to Know the
Difference”: Confidentiality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 243 (1995) (arguing in favor of an evidentiary privilege to protect
speech within A.A.); see also infra Part III (discussing critics’ views).
31
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32
See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., TWELVE STEPS
AND TWELVE TRADITIONS 176 (soft-cover edition 1981) [hereinafter TWELVE
STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS] (stating, as A.A.’s tenth tradition,
“Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence the A.A.
name ought never be drawn into public controversy”).
33
Id. (“As by some deep instinct, we A.A.’s have known from the very
beginning that we must never, no matter what the provocation, publicly take
sides in any fight, even a worthy one.”); see also Jim Fitzgerald, Judge Voids
Manslaughter Conviction, AP ONLINE, Aug. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL
25489398 (stating that an A.A. spokesman said that A.A. would not comment
on the Cox decision); Frank J. Murray, Courts Hit Sentencing DWIs to A.A.,
Fault Religious Basis, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at A10, available at 1996
WL 2970041 (stating that A.A. would not comment on various courts’
opinions finding that the organization was religion-based).
34
See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members).
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A.A.’s history is a description of the Second Circuit opinion that
designated A.A. a religious organization and an introduction to
the case that inspired this note.
A. Alcoholics Anonymous: Laying the Groundwork
Although its history extends back before its official creation,35
A.A.’s present-day roots began to form when Bill Wilson met
Dr. Bob Smith; both were professionals desperately seeking
refuge from alcoholism.36 Together, applying principles adopted
from other recovery groups, they began to create what would
become A.A.’s doctrinal foundation.37 Dr. Smith and Mr. Wilson
oversaw the establishment of three A.A. groups, one located in
Akron, another in Cleveland, and the third in New York City.38
Central to the groups’ existence was the belief that the members
needed to (1) acknowledge a lack of control over their lives and
their alcohol problem, (2) recognize that they were at the lowest
point in their lives, (3) turn their lives over to a “higher
power,”39 and (4) believe that these steps would eventually lead
to a life of sobriety.40 These four core beliefs evolved into the
now-popular “Twelve Steps,”41 first published in the 1939 book
35

See Reed, supra note 30, at 708-14 (discussing, inter alia, the history
of A.A.).
36
See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS, xv-xvii (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS].
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 25.
40
See Reed, supra note 30, at 708-14 (discussing, inter alia, the history
of A.A.).
41
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 5-9.
A.A.’s Twelve Steps are as follows:
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had
become unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore
us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of
God as we understood him.
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“Alcoholics Anonymous,”42 which were meant as suggestions for
alcoholics trying to recover.43 In 1950, A.A.’s organizers
adopted the “Twelve Traditions”44 as principles guiding the

4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the
exact nature of our wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of
character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to
make amends to them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except
when to do so would injure them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong
promptly admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious
contact with God as we understood him, praying only for knowledge
of His will for us and the power to carry that out.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we
tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these
principles in all our affairs.
Id.
42

ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36.
Id. at 59.
44
See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 9-13.
A.A.’s Twelve Traditions are as follows:
1. Our common welfare should come first; personal recovery depends
upon A.A. unity.
43

2. For our group purpose there is but one ultimate authority—a loving
God as He may express Himself in our group conscience. Our leaders
are but trusted servants; they do not govern.
3. The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop
drinking.
4. Each group should be autonomous except in matters affecting other
groups or A.A. as a whole.
5. Each group has but one primary purpose—to carry its message to
the alcoholic who still suffers.
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organization itself.45 While the founders intended the Twelve
Steps to guide an individual member to recovery, the Twelve
Traditions served to guide an individual in contributing to A.A.’s
overall success and survival.46 They were not, however,
established or subsequently interpreted as a strict set of rules.47
Rather, like the Twelve Steps, the Twelve Traditions were
unenforceable guidelines for the individual members whose own
interests A.A. was meant to serve.48
We believe there isn’t a fellowship on earth which
lavishes more devoted care upon its individual members;
surely there is none which more jealously guards the
individual’s right to think, talk, and act as he wishes. No
A.A. can compel another to do anything; nobody can be
punished or expelled. Our Twelve Steps to recovery are
6. An A.A. group ought never endorse, finance, or lend the A.A.
name to any related facility or outside enterprise, lest problems of
money, property, and prestige divert us from our primary purpose.
7. Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-supporting, declining
outside contributions.
8. Alcoholics Anonymous should remain forever nonprofessional, but
our service centers may employ special workers.
9. A.A., as such, ought never be organized; but we may create
service boards or committees directly responsible to those they serve.
10. Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence
the A.A. name ought never be drawn into public controversy.
11. Our public relations policy is based on attraction rather than
promotion; we need always maintain personal anonymity at the level
of press, radio and films.
12. Anonymity is the spiritual foundation of all our traditions, ever
reminding us to place principles before personalities.
Id.
45

Id. at 18.
Id. at 129; see also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36, at xix
(describing the rationale that led to the adoption of the Twelve Traditions as
the need to develop “principles by which the A.A. groups and A.A. as a
whole could survive and function effectively”).
47
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129.
48
Id.
46
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suggestions; the Twelve Traditions which guarantee
A.A.’s unity contain not a single “Don’t.” They
repeatedly say “We ought . . .” but never “You Must!”49
B. Problematic Reasoning Spawns a Religion
A.A. views itself as a secular organization.50 It is not
affiliated with, nor does it endorse, any religion or religious
group.51 Indeed, theists and atheists can apply A.A.’s
principles.52 Regardless, the judicial community has begun
viewing A.A. as a religious organization.53
49

Id.
See, e.g., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36, at xx (“Alcoholics
Anonymous is not a religious organization.”); 44 Questions, pamphlet P-2, at
19 (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1952) (“A.A. is not a
religious society.”); This is AA, pamphlet P-1, at 7 (Alcoholics Anonymous
World Service, Inc., 1984) (“We are not reformers, and we are not allied
with any group, cause, or religious denomination.”).
51
See supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s sixth tradition).
52
See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 27
(“You can, if you wish, make A.A. itself your higher power.”).
53
See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 101-05 (N.Y. 1996)
(holding that a prison requiring inmates to attend a rehabilitation program that
incorporated A.A. and N.A. in order to receive various benefits constituted an
excessive entanglement in religion); In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1094 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that A.A.’s religious content precludes the
government from coercing an inmate to attend A.A. meetings). It is not clear
whether courts adopting this view have technically designated A.A. as a
religion, as opposed to simply a secular organization incorporating spiritual
ideals into its suggestions for achieving sobriety. For example, in Warner v.
Orange County Dep’t of Prob. the Second Circuit refers to A.A.’s “substantial
religious component,” 115 F.3d 1068, 1070 (2d Cir. 1996), “religion-infused
meetings,” id. at 1074, and “religious exercises,” id. at 1075. The court also
referred to A.A. as a “religious program,” id., and describes A.A. meetings
as “intensely religious events.” Id. Additionally, the Warner court
distinguished between A.A. meetings and a public school offering a
commencement prayer. Id. at 1076. A subsequent Second Circuit case
interpreted Warner as having characterized A.A. as a religion. See DeStefano
v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 407 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding the
district court’s finding, which was based on Warner, that A.A. is “a religion
for Establishment Clause purposes”) (internal quotations omitted). The Cox
50
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Most cases holding that A.A. is a religious organization
involve a prisoner or probationer bringing suit on the grounds
that the government required him or her to attend A.A.
meetings54 or meetings of other recovery programs adopting
court shared this view. Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d. 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (“Our Court of Appeals has subsequently held in the context of an
Establishment Clause case that A.A. is a religion . . . .”). This note accepts,
for now, the Cox court’s interpretation, but utilizes the term “religious
organization” when referring to A.A.
Presently, not all courts addressing the issue agree that A.A. is a religious
organization. See, e.g., Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (“The mere reference to spirituality, or the use of terms that may be
commonly associated with religion, without more, cannot change the character
of A.A. or N.A. . . . from that of aiming to treat chemically dependent
individuals to that of advancing or inhibiting religion as a principal or primary
purpose.”); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *4
(S.D. Iowa, Apr. 29, 1993) (holding that A.A.’s religious content does not
transform it into a religious organization); Salaam v. Collins, 830 F. Supp.
853, 863 (D. Md. 1993) (classifying A.A. as a “secular self-help . . .
organization[]”); Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014, 1016-17 (D. Kan.
1991) (holding that A.A.’s spiritual content and reference to a “Higher
Power” are not sufficient to deem A.A. a religion; therefore, requiring an
inmate to attend meetings of program based on A.A. did not violate the
Establishment Clause); Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 899 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (dismissing an argument that A.A. is a “quasi-religious organization,”
noting that “[t]he primary function of Alcoholics Anonymous is to cope with
the disease of alcoholism”); State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162, 1169-70 (Me.
1994) (holding that the religious privilege is inapplicable to A.A.
communication).
In addition, some opinions raise the issue but fail to reach a definitive
decision. See O’Connor v. State, 855 F. Supp. 303, 307-08 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(noting A.A.’s “religious overtones” but never making clear whether the court
viewed A.A. as a religious organization for Establishment Clause purposes,
emphasizing that the “‘principal and primary effect’ of encouraging
participation in A.A. is not to advance religious belief but to treat substance
abuse”) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
54
DeStefano represents the exception. 247 F.3d 397. This case was
brought in the Second Circuit after Warner, which initially deemed A.A. a
religious organization. See Warner, 115 F.3d 1068. The plaintiff in
DeStefano, then mayor of Middletown, N.Y., sued as a taxpayer on the
grounds that the state was funding a private alcoholic treatment facility that
incorporated A.A. meetings into its program. DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 401.
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principles similar or identical to the Twelve Steps.55 For
example, in Warner v. Orange County Department of
Probation,56 the Second Circuit held that a probationer could not
be compelled to attend A.A. meetings against his will when he
had no foreknowledge of A.A.’s “intensely religious events”57
and he had not waived his objection to attending the meetings.58
As support for its unilateral transformation of A.A. into a
religious organization,59 the Second Circuit cited the various
The court upheld Warner but found that the state funding of a large, purely
secular alcohol treatment program that merely incorporated A.A. as a part of
the program did not, by itself, violate the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 408-09.
55
See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
N.A. is a religious organization). Although A.A. is not affiliated with any
other organization, it cooperates with those wishing to adopt A.A.’s methods
to combat addiction. See, e.g., supra note 44 (quoting A.A.’s sixth tradition);
Information on Alcoholics Anonymous, form F-2 (Alcoholics Anonymous
World Service, Inc. 1999). For example, Narcotics Anonymous (“N.A.”) has
adapted A.A.’s Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions to conform to its own
mission. See The Toronto Area of Narcotics Anonymous, Twelve Steps of
Narcotics Anonymous, at http://www.torontona.ca/12%20steps.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2002); The Toronto Area of Narcotics Anonymous, Twelve
Traditions of Narcotics Anonymous, at http://www.torontona.ca/12%
20traditions.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
56
115 F.3d 1068.
57
Id. at 1075.
58
Id. at 1074.
59
The term “unilateral” serves a dual purpose. First, although the Second
Circuit was not the first to hold that a twelve step program constituted a
religious organization for Establishment Clause purposes, it was the highest
federal court to apply that distinction specifically to A.A. The Seventh Circuit,
in Kerr v. Farrey, had already determined that Narcotics Anonymous was a
religious organization. 95 F.3d at 480. Kerr addressed an inmate’s claim that
the state had violated his constitutional rights by coercing him to attend N.A.
meetings. Id. at 473. The court found that the meetings centered on N.A.’s
own version of the Twelve Steps, which, nearly identical to A.A.’s, included
references to God. Id. at 474. The court stated that regardless of one’s
interpretation of God, N.A. had incorporated into its program a “religious
concept of a higher power.” Id. at 480. The state, therefore, could not coerce
prisoners to attend N.A. meetings. Id. Second, the term “unilaterally” is used
here to draw attention to the fact that the Second Circuit, while appearing to
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references within the Twelve Steps to “God” or a “Higher
Power,”60 as well as the Southern District of New York’s factual
findings that the A.A. meetings at issue incorporated
“Christian”61 prayers.62 The court did not indicate which factor
was decisive—the references to God or the use of prayer.
Consequently, it is not clear whether the court viewed the
language of the Twelve Steps alone as sufficient for A.A. to
qualify as a religious organization, or whether something more,
such as the incorporation of prayer, is necessary.
Although the Second Circuit has not clarified the issue, were
it to do so it would likely find that the Twelve Steps language
alone is insufficient to deem A.A. a religious entity. The Warner
court quoted passages from the Twelve Steps,63 but it is not clear
that the court did anything more than selectively choose only
act on A.A.’s behalf by affording a special degree of constitutional protection,
operated without any input by A.A, which has always adhered to the view that
it is a secular organization. See supra note 50 (referring to the various
statements A.A. has made regarding its secular nature).
60
Warner, 115 F.3d at 1070. The court noted that A.A.’s second, third,
fifth, sixth, seventh, and eleventh steps contain either or both references. Id.;
see also supra note 41 (listing the Twelve Steps).
61
Warner, 115 F.3d at 1070; see also Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of
Prob., 870 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (describing the “Lord’s Prayer”
as being “specifically Christian”). The meetings Warner attended began with
the “Serenity Prayer,” which the district court determined was “nondenominational.” Id. It states, “Lord, grant me the serenity to accept the
things that I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the
wisdom to know the difference.” Id. Additionally, the district court found that
the meetings ended with the “Lord’s Prayer.” Id. The King James version of
the Bible translates the Lord’s Prayer:
Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name.
Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.
Give us this day our daily bread.
And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors
And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil: For thine is
the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, for ever. Amen.
Matthew 6:9-13.
62
Warner, 115 F.3d at 1070.
63
Id.
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those passages supporting its view that A.A. is a religious
organization.64 If this is true, the case sets an unnerving
precedent. While judicial interpretation of an organization’s
doctrine might be necessary to draw legal conclusions, the
judiciary should in so doing ensure that the process is a diligent
effort to uncover the truth.65 Applying standards similar to canons
of statutory interpretation, a court should necessarily extend its
investigation beyond the ambiguous verbiage of the Twelve Steps
in order to give effect to A.A.’s intent.66 Consequently, the court
would find that A.A. considers it appropriate to look to the
organization itself as one’s “Higher Power.”67 Thus, within the
A.A. framework, the terms “Higher Power” and “God” assume
entirely generic characteristics.68 Mere reference to a Higher

64

Id.
See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986) (describing the U.S.
“system of justice” as “dedicated to a search for truth”); see also United
States v. Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that federal
courts “construe evidentiary privileges narrowly” because they “obstruct the
search for truth”); In re Cueto, 554 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he public
has a right to every person’s evidence. There are a small number of
constitutional, common-law and statutory exceptions to that general rule, but
they have been neither ‘lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are
in derogation of the search for truth.’”) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
66
See, e.g., New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co.,
91 U.S. 656, 662 (1875) (“Statutes must be interpreted according to the intent
and meaning of the legislature.”).
67
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 27.
68
See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 756 (3d ed. 1996) (defining
“generic” as “relating to or descriptive of an entire group or class; general”).
In this context, since one following the Twelve Steps can view either one’s
interpretation of God or the A.A. group itself as one’s higher power, then in
the A.A. framework, the A.A. group would be analogous to God. In religious
terms, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to draw an acceptable
comparison between the A.A. group and a divine entity. Since both can be
considered as one’s higher power, however, it would seem that to the
recovering alcoholic following A.A.’s guidelines, either God or the A.A.
group would serve generally as a source, beyond the individual, to which one
looks for strength and guidance. See Richard D. Land & Michael K.
Whitehead, Do Students Have a Prayer After Lee v. Weisman, 6 U. FLA. J.L.
65
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Power or God within the Twelve Steps, without more, is hardly
sufficient to label A.A. a religious organization, lest the Twelve
Steps become to the twenty-first century what the “neck verse”
was to the seventeenth.69
& PUB. POL’Y 231, 245 (1994) (referring to “a generic ‘brand-X’ God”);
Melissa M. Weldon, Honoring the Spirit in the Law: A Lawyer’s Confession of
Faith, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1167, 1167 (1999) (describing both “higher
power” and “God” as “generic terms”).
69
The term “neck verse” refers to the test once utilized in England to
determine whether a criminally accused person was a member of the clergy
and, thus, deserving of the “benefit of clergy,” which precluded
administration of the death penalty. HAROLD POTTER, POTTER’S HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 362-63 (A.K.R.
Kiralfy ed., 1958). Until the early eighteenth century, benefit of clergy was
conferred upon only those who could read, the presumption being that clergy
were the only literate members of society. See Sir Frank Kermode, Justice and
Mercy in Shakespeare, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1996). To establish
literacy, the court required an accused to read or recite a particular biblical
verse. POTTER, supra, at 362. As the literacy rate increased, however, and
knowledge of the verse became widespread, the neck verse became unreliable,
eventually serving to aid even those who were prohibited by law from
becoming ordained. Id.
Had the Warner court determined that the mere presence of words
evoking the concept of “God” within the credo or doctrine of an organization
was, by itself, enough to label that organization religious, the Establishment
Clause would take on new meaning. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 692-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the United States’
adoption of “‘In God We Trust’ on coins, and opening court sessions with
‘God save the United States and this honorable court’” as “government
acknowledgements of religion,” as opposed to endorsement of religion). In
Lynch, the Court held that a city’s inclusion of a Nativity scene within its
Christmas display did not constitute government endorsement or advancement
of religion and, thus, violate the Establishment Clause when the purpose and
the overall effect of the display were secular. Id. at 681-83. The Court noted
that the display, aside from the Nativity scene, also included “a Santa Claus
house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree,
carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant,
and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that reads
‘Seasons Greetings’ . . . .” Id. at 671. The court went on to say the following:
It would be ironic, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of a
particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration
acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this
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As the Second Circuit stated in Warner, however, something
more was present at the meetings the plaintiff attended—Christian
prayers.70 This appears to have tipped the scales in favor of
recognizing A.A. as a religious organization.71 But, the Warner
country by the people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress,
and the courts for two centuries, would so “taint” the City’s exhibit
as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid the
use of this one passive symbol—the crè che—at the very time people
are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in
public schools and other public places, and while the Congress and
Legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains would be a
stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and to our holdings. If the
presence of the crè che in this display violates the Establishment
Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas, and
of our religious heritage, are equally offensive to the Constitution.
Id. at 686. Later holding that a county and city’s display depicting the Nativity
violated the Establishment Clause, the Court, in County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, interpreted Lynch
to require an evaluation of the setting of the religious symbol. 492 U.S. 573,
598 (1989). The display at issue in County of Allegheny contained only the
Nativity scene encased in a “floral frame.” Id. at 599. It follows that the
Warner court would be compelled to view the religious references within
A.A.’s Twelve Steps in relation to their “setting,” as the Supreme Court did
in County of Allegheny, before determining that A.A. is a religious
organization. Id. Otherwise, any organized group could conceivably
incorporate the concept of God, even superficially, within its bylaws or motto,
and enjoy the constitutional status of a religious organization. Such a course
would render the Establishment Clause as meaningless as the neck verse,
which was abolished in 1707. See POTTER, supra, at 363.
70
Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075.
71
Id. Looking beyond the Twelve Steps, the Warner court stated the
following:
The A.A. program to which Warner was exposed had a substantial
religious component. Participants were told to pray to God for help in
overcoming their affliction. Meetings opened and closed with group
prayer. The trial judge reasonably found that it “placed a heavy
emphasis on spirituality and prayer, in both conception and in
practice.” We have no doubt that the meetings Warner attended were
intensely religious events.
Id. (emphasis added). In a footnote following the above passage, the Warner
court noted that the district court had focused much of its attention on the
prayers at the A.A. meetings in question. Id. n.6.
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court disregarded the fact that each of the 100,766 A.A. groups
currently operating worldwide is entirely autonomous,72 needs
only two people to exist73 and completely controls the content and
format of its meetings.74 Thus, the Second Circuit’s
determination that, as a matter of law, A.A. in its entirety is a
religious organization sweeps aside one of the crucial support
structures enabling A.A. to exist and succeed—its antidogmatism.75 Despite the label affixed by the Second Circuit,
A.A. continues to hold itself out as a loosely organized secular
society comprised of groups of alcoholics gathered for the sole
purpose of removing alcohol from their lives.76
72

See supra note 44 (quoting A.A.’s fourth and seventh traditions).
See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 14647. A.A.’s sponsorship method and tradition four suggest that at least two
people are necessary to form a “group.” See id. There are, however, “lone”
members who maintain contact with the General Service Office in New York.
This Is AA, supra note 50, at 19. Furthermore, A.A.’s explanation of tradition
three states that a person is a member of A.A. if she “says so.” TWELVE
STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 139. The desire to stop
drinking is the only requirement. Id.
74
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 146
(“[E]very A.A. group can manage its affairs exactly as it pleases.”).
75
A complete analysis of the Warner decision is beyond the scope of this
note. While the author does not entirely agree with the Second Circuit’s
decision, he does accept the decision’s precedential value in recognizing A.A.
as a religious organization.
76
See Alcoholics Anonymous, Defining “Alcoholics Anonymous,” at
http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/english/E_FactFile/M-24_d3.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2002). The web site describes A.A. in the following terms:
Alcoholics Anonymous is a fellowship of men and women who share
their experience, strength and hope with each other that they may
solve their common problem and help others to recover from
alcoholism.
73

The only requirement for membership is a desire to stop drinking.
There are no dues or fees for A.A. membership; we are selfsupporting through our own contributions. A.A. is not allied with any
sect, denomination, politics, organization or institution; does not wish
to engage in any controversy; neither endorses nor opposes any
causes. Our primary purpose is to stay sober and help other
alcoholics achieve sobriety.
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C. The Sheep Follows the Shepherd Down the Slippery Slope
By extending New York’s religious privilege to protect
communications within A.A., the Southern District of New York
offers a glimpse of the potentially far-reaching problems that will
inevitably arise from the Second Circuit’s Warner decision.77 On
December 6, 1994, Paul Cox was convicted of a double homicide
he had committed six years before in Westchester County, N.Y.78
In 1988, Mr. Cox, after an evening of heavy drinking, entered
his former childhood residence and repeatedly stabbed Shanta
Chervu and her husband Lakshman Rao Chervu with one of their
own kitchen knives.79 A palm print and a fingerprint were the
only pieces of physical evidence left at the scene of the crime.80
Despite committing the acts in what he later claimed was the
midst of an alcoholic blackout, Mr. Cox had the wherewithal to
dispose of the weapon and his bloody clothes upon returning
home, where he lived with his parents.81 The crime remained
unsolved for several years.82
In 1990, Mr. Cox began attending A.A. meetings.83 During
the course of his recovery, Mr. Cox revealed to “at least eight
fellow A.A. members” his belief that he had killed the Chervus.84
He later claimed that his blackout on the night of the murders
prevented him from knowing for a fact that he was the killer.85

Alcoholics Anonymous can also be defined as an informal society of
more than 2,000,000 recovered alcoholics in the United States,
Canada, and other countries.
Id.
77

Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Warner v.
Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1996).
78
Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 788.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 789.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 789-90.
85
Id.
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Still, he made no effort to dispel the uncertainty.86 Among those
in whom Mr. Cox confided his secret was Ms. H,87 who lived
with Mr. Cox and attended A.A. meetings with him.88 After Mr.
Cox told Ms. H of his questionable past, Ms. H divulged this
information to her psychologist, who then advised her to seek the
advice of counsel.89 On the advice of her attorney, Ms. H then
told the district attorney what she knew.90 The law enforcement
authorities questioned the other A.A. members and, based on the
information gained, established the probable cause necessary to
arrest Mr. Cox.91 Mr. Cox was charged with and convicted of
86

Id.
See id. at 790 (noting that the prosecutor and the trial court maintained
the anonymity of the testifying A.A. members by identifying them by the first
letter of their last name).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Although this note focuses on the Cox court’s determination that
communication within A.A. is privileged, the Cox opinion is troubling for
other reasons. Ultimately, the court granted Mr. Cox habeas corpus based on
its finding that Mr. Cox’s fingerprints, procured solely as a result of probable
cause established by the compelled statements of his fellow A.A. members,
were, thus, wrongfully obtained. Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792, 793. Because
the fingerprint and palm print Mr. Cox left behind were the only pieces of
physical evidence linking him to the crime, the court determined that without
that evidence law enforcement would have been unable to establish the
probable cause necessary to arrest Mr. Cox in the first place. Id.
Consequently, the court held that the evidence should have “been suppressed
as ‘fruit of the poison tree.’” Id. (quoting, without attribution, Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)).
Justice Frankfurter, in Nardone, first coined the poetic metaphor to which
the Cox court referred. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341. Since then, the term has
been used to illustrate the principle that information gathered from evidence
wrongfully obtained is tainted and, thus, inadmissible. See, e.g., Florida v.
White, 526 U.S. 559, 565-66 (1999) (holding that a warrantless search did not
violate the criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and, thus, the
evidence obtained therefrom was not tainted); Harrison v. United States, 392
U.S. 219, 222 (1968) (holding that a criminal defendant’s testimony was
tainted, and thus inadmissible, when “impelled” by the desire to overcome the
effects of illegally obtained confessions); People v. Powers, 732 N.Y.S.2d
779, 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that “oral admission” offered by a
87
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manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to a maximum of
fifty years in prison.92 The Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,93 and the Court of
Appeals of New York denied Mr. Cox leave to appeal.94 Mr.
Cox then petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds
that, inter alia, law enforcement authorities had no probable
cause to arrest him absent the A.A. members’ testimony, use of
which Mr. Cox claimed violated his constitutional rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.95 Specifically, Mr. Cox
criminal defendant after police searched his apartment pursuant to a warrant
that was later found invalid was admissible). This principle was, perhaps, first
elucidated by Justice Holmes, who wrote, “The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be
used at all.” Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (emphasis added). Regarding an exception to the rule, Justice Holmes
continued, “[T]his does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred
and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source
they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the
Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.” Id.
Whether the “fruit of the poison tree” principle applies to privileged
communication, however, is unclear. At least one court has observed that “no
court has ever applied this theory to any evidentiary privilege.” United States
v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 731 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to address a
claim that evidence allegedly procured as the result of violations of the spousal
privilege should be suppressed); see also United States v. Squillacote, 221
F.3d 542, 560 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing and quoting Marashi with
approval). For support, the Marashi court looked to United States v.
Lefkowitz, which stated in a footnote that information obtained indirectly from
privileged communication, when the privilege was not constitutionally
grounded, such as the marital privilege, would not be considered tainted.
Marashi, 913 F.2d at 731 n.11. See Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1319 n.8 (9th
Cir. 1980). The Cox court’s summary disposition of the matter, therefore, was
disingenuous, and the issue, though beyond the scope of this note, is ripe for
the picking.
92
Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 788; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20
(Consol. 2002) (defining and proscribing first degree manslaughter).
93
People v. Cox, 696 N.Y.S.2d 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
94
People v. Cox, 728 N.E.2d 985 (N.Y. 2000).
95
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The First
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argued that communication with A.A. members was confidential
and protected by New York’s religious privilege.96 Based on the
Second Circuit’s holding that A.A. is a religious organization,97
the district court concluded that the Establishment Clause could
not sustain applying the religious privilege to other established
religions and not A.A., a judicially established religion.98
Consequently, the court granted Mr. Cox his writ, though it
withheld issuance until the Second Circuit could review the
district court’s decision.99 Presently, the judicially established
church of A.A. still stands, and the Cox opinion will surely serve
as a measuring stick to see how far the Second Circuit will allow
the Warner opinion to slide down the slippery slope.100
II. WHY LAW AND POLICY MUST REMOVE THE GAG FROM A.A.
The Cox decision is the first in the nation to apply the
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1791, reads, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment,
ratified in 1868, reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
96
Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
97
Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir.
1996).
98
Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792 (“There is no principled basis for a court
to hold that A.A. is a religion for Establishment Clause purposes, and yet that
disclosure of wrongs to a fellow member as ordained by the Twelve Steps
does not qualify for purposes of a privilege granted to other religions similarly
situated.”).
99
Id. at 793.
100
Warner, 115 F.3d 1068.
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religious privilege to communication within A.A.101 Given that
numerous organizations have adopted A.A.’s Twelve Steps,102 it
is likely that they will be recognized as religious organizations as
well.103 Consequently, if the Cox opinion is accepted, the
religious privilege would also apply to these groups. This must
not happen. The Cox decision is based on faulty factual analysis
and legal reasoning, and public policy demands that the religious
privilege not be extended to communications between A.A.
members.104

101

Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787.
Although this list is not exhaustive, examples of organizations adopting
variations of A.A.’s Twelve Steps include the following: Cocaine Anonymous,
Cocaine Anonymous World Services, 12 Steps & 12 Traditions of C.A., at
http:// www.ca.org/12and12.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Co-Dependents
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Co-Dependents Anonymous, at http://www.
codependents.org/coda12st.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Crystal Meth
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Crystal Meth Anonymous, at http://www.
crystalmeth.org/aboutCMA.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Debtors
Anonymous, 12 Steps of Debtors Anonymous, at http://www.
debtorsanonymous.org/steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Emotions
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Emotions Anonymous, at http://www.mtn.
org/EA/Steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Gamblers Anonymous, The
Recovery Program, at http://www.gamblersanonymous.org/recovery.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Marijuana Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of
Marijuana Anonymous, at http://www.marijuana-anonymous.org/Pages/
12steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Narcotics Anonymous, supra note
55; Nicotine Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Nicotine Anonymous, at
http://www.nicotine-anonymous.org/pamphlet/english/2001_12steps.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2002); Overeaters Anonymous, The Twelve Steps, at http://
www.overeatersanonymous.org/12steps.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002);
Sexaholics Anonymous, The Twelve Steps of Sexaholics Anonymous, at http://
www.sa.org/steps/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); Sexual Compulsives
Anonymous, The Twelve Suggested Steps of SCA, at http://www.sca-recovery.
org/Steps.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2002); and Survivors of Incest
Anonymous, The Twelve Steps, at http://www.siawso.org/12steps.htm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2002).
103
See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that N.A. is a religious organization).
104
See infra Part II.B (discussing the policy implications of the Cox
decision).
102

BARRYMACRO7-11FINAL.DOC

458

7/24/02 11:13 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
A. Dismantling Cox

The district court’s decision in Cox is flawed for a number of
reasons. It not only mischaracterizes A.A.’s structure and
methods, but it also completely overlooks a Supreme Court
limitation on the judiciary’s ability to develop evidentiary
privileges, thus ignoring the obvious boundaries of the religious
privilege.105 Similarly, although the court quotes the New York
statute granting the religious privilege,106 it then misinterprets a
New York decision in order to circumvent the explicit legislative
requirements.107 As a result, the Cox court establishes a precedent
with no legal, logical or social support whatsoever.
1. Misunderstanding A.A.
The Cox opinion makes several statements describing A.A. in
a way that could only have resulted from misunderstanding the
organization and the principles that have ensured its survival and
notable success.108 Although it is questionable whether and how
far courts should delve into a particular organization’s doctrine,
the Second Circuit’s opinion in Warner established precedent for
doing so, at least with respect to determining whether an
organization is, in fact, religious.109 The Cox court followed the
Second Circuit’s example, even to the extent of not fully
analyzing A.A.’s doctrine before arriving at its unfortunate
conclusion.110
105

See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the restraints on the federal judiciary
in developing evidentiary privileges).
106
Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 790; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505
(McKinney 2001). The New York statute requires a communication to be of a
confessional or confidential nature revealed to a member of the clergy who is
acting in her professional capacity as a spiritual advisor. Id.
107
See People v. Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959 (N.Y. 1993). See infra Part
II.A.2 (discussing the Cox court’s application of Carmona).
108
See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members).
109
Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1070 (2d
Cir. 1996) (discussing the references to “God” in the Twelve Steps).
110
See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
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Beginning with the statement “initially A.A. was a self-help
group which did not consider or represent itself as an established
religion, but helped many Alcoholics, who continued to belong to
and worship with their own churches or other religious groups
while belonging to A.A.,”111 the Cox court reveals all too quickly
the inadequacy of its inquiry. The quoted sentence implies two
false facts: (1) A.A. now considers itself to represent a religion,
and (2) A.A. members are necessarily religious and affiliated
with a church. These are boldly inaccurate assumptions. While
some courts may have intervened to dub A.A. a religious
organization,112 A.A. has always held itself out as secular and has
never endorsed any religion.113 Furthermore, the members of
A.A. do not necessarily belong to a religious organization, as
A.A. welcomes anyone seeking sobriety regardless of his or her
theological beliefs.114 Thus, the district court’s initial
The Twelve Steps must be accomplished one by one, beginning with
the first step. A new member will be sponsored and assisted by one
or more existing members of the organization. Members interact on a
first name basis only. The entire relationship is both anonymous and
confidential. Members are forbidden from telling outside statements
made at a meeting. The eighth step requires the new member to have
“made a list of all persons we had harmed and became willing to
make amends to them all.” Step five, preliminary to step eight,
required that the new member have “admitted to God, to ourselves,
and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs.”
Id. (quoting the Twelve Steps) (alterations in original). It is interesting to note
that, while the district court treated A.A.’s Twelve Steps as though they were
binding on the members and enforced by the organization, the fact that Mr.
Cox revealed his secret to no fewer than eight fellow A.A. members, as
opposed to simply “another human being,” as the court emphasized, seems not
to have caused the court any hesitation. Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 789-90.
111
Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
112
See supra note 53 (discussing cases that have found A.A. to be a
religious organization).
113
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 36, at xx; 44 Questions, supra
note 50, at 19; This Is AA, supra note 50, at 7.
114
See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 139;
see also supra Part I.B (discussing the gradual judicial perception of A.A. as a
religious organization despite A.A.’s contrary position and its provision of
interpretive guidance for atheist members).
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characterization is clearly incorrect.
Having set the pace, the Cox court stays on a misguided
course throughout its opinion, stating that A.A. members are
“forbidden” from revealing statements made at the meetings,115
that A.A. “impos[ed]” its discipline on Mr. Cox,116 and that the
organization requires the Twelve Steps to be followed in a
particular manner.117 Although anonymity might be a driving
force behind A.A.’s success, as with the other traditions, the
extent to which A.A. members maintain anonymity is entirely
self-determined.118 A.A. makes no demands; therefore, it cannot
forbid its members from discussing the meetings or the
information conveyed therein.119 Similarly, A.A. lacks the desire
and the authority to impose itself on anyone.120 Nor does A.A.
attempt to dictate to members how they must work through the
Twelve Steps.121 Rather, A.A. expressly states that individuals
115

Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
Id.
117
Id. (“The Twelve Steps must be accomplished one by one.”).
118
See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 184.
The anonymous nature of A.A. was initially meant to protect alcoholics who,
for various reasons, wanted to conceal their association with the group. Id.
Hence, A.A. members refer to one another by only their first name and last
initial. Understanding Anonymity, pamphlet P-47, at 10 (Alcoholics
Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1981). For example, A.A. literature refers
to one of its cofounders, Mr. Wilson, as Bill W. See, e.g., id. at 7. Mr.
Wilson and Dr. Smith were aware of the consequences being labeled an
alcoholic could have on businesspeople, professionals, and those desiring to
maintain a particular social status. Id. at 5. In the 1930s and 40s, when A.A.
was a fledgling organization and the disease of alcoholism was not well
understood, people were wary of the social stigma of being associated with an
organization for recovering alcoholics. Id. at 5-7. Although much more is now
known, A.A.’s principle of anonymity is still important in light of the social
stigma that persists today. Id.; see also supra note 44 (quoting A.A.’s twelfth
tradition).
119
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129 (“No
A.A. [sic] can compel another to do anything; nobody can be punished or
expelled.”).
120
Id.
121
See 44 Questions, supra note 50, at 16 (“The absence of rules,
regulations, or musts is one of the unique features of A.A. as a local group
116
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should accomplish the steps in whatever manner they feel
comfortable.122 A.A.’s Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions are
merely suggestions for those seeking sobriety.123 A member has
no obligation to A.A., legal or otherwise, other than those she
may create for herself.124 Consequently, the A.A. member is—or
was, before Cox—free to tell the world everything that happened
at the meetings.125 Although the member who does this may not
feel welcome at future meetings with the same group, any effort
to exclude her would violate many, if not all, of A.A.’s
principles.126
and as a worldwide fellowship.”).
122
Id.
123
See TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129.
Although theoretically true, A.A.’s explanation of tradition one states that
A.A. members will eventually come to realize on their own that the steps are
necessary for the alcoholic’s survival. Id. at 130-31.
124
Id. at 129.
125
Id. The Cox opinion strips A.A. members of their ability to participate
in the criminal justice system by reporting known criminal activity as is
expected of responsible citizens. See infra Part II.B (discussing the policy
implications of the Cox decision). The psychological effects of this judicial
segregation could cost recovering alcoholics their sobriety. See, e.g., Kathleen
T. Brady & Susan C. Sonne, The Role of Stress in Alcohol Use, Alcoholism
Treatment, and Relapse, 23 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH, No. 4, 263-71 (1999)
(noting a relation between the physiological effects of stress, social factors and
alcohol relapse); James R. McKay, Studies of Factors in Relapse to Alcohol,
Drug and Nicotine Use: A Critical Review of Methodologies and Findings, 60
J. OF STUD. ON ALCOHOL, No. 4, at 566 (1999) (stating that the various
methodologies all conclude that, inter alia, interpersonal and emotional issues
contribute to relapse).
126
See generally TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note
32. One of the underlying principles of A.A. is the acceptance of flawed
individuals. Id. at 139. A.A. explains tradition three:
A.A. is really saying to every serious drinker, “You are an A.A.
member if you say so. You can declare yourself in; nobody can keep
you out. No matter who you are, no matter how low you’ve gone, no
matter how grave your emotional complications—even your crimes—
we still can’t deny you A.A.”
Id. Thus, A.A. serves as a den of equality, where persons admittedly at the
lowest point in their lives can seek the support of others without fear of being
judged. Id. Breaching an obligation some members may view as sacred
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2.

Cox Misinterprets the New York Court of Appeals

Beyond mischaracterizing A.A., the Cox opinion overstates
the applicability of the New York decision in People v.
Carmona.127 In Carmona, the New York Court of Appeals
discussed the applicability of the religious privilege to
communications between the defendant, who was a confessed
killer, and two ministers.128 Without making reference to the
religion practiced by the ministers who had spoken to the
defendant, the Carmona court discussed the evolution of the
religious privilege, stressing its modern-day application to
communications taking place beyond the realm of the Catholic
confessional.129 The Carmona court stated that the privilege
applies to confidential communication with ministers of all
religions, and that the only test for determining whether the
communication is privileged is “whether the communication in
question was made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining
spiritual guidance.”130 The status of the ministers in Carmona,
however, was never in question; therefore, the issue was neither
discussed nor dismissed as unnecessary.
In contrast, the chief issue before the Cox court was whether
A.A. members are “professional . . . spiritual advisor[s]”131 as
required by New York’s religious privilege.132 The district court
in Cox quoted verbatim much of the Carmona court’s discussion,

arguably would only serve as a symptom of a member’s illness. Id. at 141.
“[E]xperience taught us that to take away any alcoholic’s full chance was
sometimes to pronounce his death sentence, and often to condemn him to
endless misery. Who dared to be judge, jury, and executioner of his own sick
brother?” Id.
127
627 N.E.2d 959 (N.Y. 1993).
128
Id.
129
Id. at 961.
130
Id. at 962.
131
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001).
132
Id. The lack of treatment afforded the issue, however, suggests
otherwise. See infra II.A.4 (discussing the Cox court’s conversion of A.A. in
order to apply the religious privilege).
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relying heavily on the usurped text and little else.133 In doing so,
the Cox opinion ultimately afforded too much weight to a largely
inapposite case.134

133

See Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The Cox
court quoted the following passage from Carmona:
Although often referred to as a “priest-penitent” privilege, the
statutory privilege is not limited to communications with a particular
class of clerics or congregants. Nor is it confined to “penitential
admission[s] . . . of a perceived transgression” or “avowals made
‘under the cloak of the confessional.’” On the contrary, in enacting
CPLR 4505, the Legislature intended to recognize “the urgent need
of the people to confide in, without fear of reprisal, those entrusted
with the pressing task of offering spiritual guidance” without regard
to the religion’s specific beliefs or practices. While the privilege may
have “ha[d] its origins in the Roman Catholic sacrament of Penance,
in which a person privately confesses his or her sins to a priest [and
t]he priest is enjoined by Church law . . . to maintain the
confidentiality of the confession,” the New York statute is
intentionally aimed at all religious ministers who perform “significant
spiritual counseling which may involve disclosure of sensitive
matters.” Indeed, the drafters of the current codification struck the
concluding phrase from the predecessor provision, which made the
privilege applicable to communications made “in the course of
discipline, enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to
which he belongs” because the phrase was ambiguous and rendered it
“doubtful whether the rule applies to any confessions other than those
to a Catholic priest.” Accordingly, what is more appropriately
dubbed the “cleric-congregant” privilege is applicable to ministers of
all religions, most of which have no ritual analogous to that of the
Catholic confession. Despite the concurrence’s “four canon” analysis,
New York’s test for the privilege’s applicability distills to a single
inquiry: whether the communication in question was made in
confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
134
See generally Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959. More recent New York
cases demonstrate that Carmona did not eliminate the requirement that the
communication be made to a member of the clergy as the Cox court implies.
See, e.g., Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (N.Y. 2001) (noting
that New York’s religious privilege “applies to confidential communications
made by congregants to clerics of all religions”) (citing Carmona, 627 N.E.2d
959).
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3. Testimonial Privileges Should Be Strictly Construed

The Cox opinion disregards the limitations the Supreme Court
has placed on the federal judiciary’s ability to develop evidentiary
privileges.135 In Trammel v. United States,136 the Supreme Court
135

See generally Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787. The Cox opinion quotes
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 and discusses one New York case addressing the statute.
Id. at 790-91. The district court, however, made no reference to Federal Rule
of Evidence 501, which provides the federal judiciary the ability to create and
develop evidentiary rules “[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution
of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court.” FED. R. EVID. 501. Nor did the court address Federal
Rule of Evidence 1101(c), which states, “The rule with respect to privileges
applies at all stages of actions, cases, and proceedings.” FED. R. EVID.
1101(c); see also FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) advisory committee’s note (stating
that “singling out the rules of privilege for special treatment, is made
necessary by the limited applicability of the remaining rules”). The conclusion
that the Cox court should have incorporated federal law into its opinion is
further supported by Duckworth v. Owen, II, a case in which the Supreme
Court denied certiorari to a state prisoner convicted of state crimes who
claimed that the Seventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, erred in holding
that the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not a particular state’s (in that case,
Indiana’s) evidentiary rules, apply in a federal habeas decision. 452 U.S. 951,
951 (1981). Although the Supreme Court’s denial contains no textual material,
the dissenting opinion is enlightening. See id. at 951 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Noting that whether the federal rules of evidence applied in this
case was the only question presented, the dissent states, “No one would
disagree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Indiana rules of
evidence do not apply in a federal habeas proceeding.” Id. at 953 (emphasis
added); see also Procella v. Beto, 319 F. Supp. 662, 670 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(noting, in a case involving a state prisoner convicted of state crimes, that
“federal evidentiary rules govern federal habeas corpus hearings”). In a case
with issues similar to Cox, Edney v. Smith, Judge Jack Weinstein reviewed a
state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus grounded on a claim that the trial
court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by allowing his psychiatrist to
testify against him. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). The petitioner
argued that the court violated the state physician-patient privilege, which he
claimed was of a constitutional nature. Id. at 1039. Noting that the privilege
did not exist at common law but that most states had adopted the privilege,
Judge Weinstein looked to federal law regarding the physician-patient
privilege to determine whether the petitioner’s claim had merit. Id. at 103945.
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curtailed the right of a husband to prevent his wife from
voluntarily testifying against him by claiming spousal privilege.137
In so doing, the Court described the restraint courts should
exercise in the development of evidentiary privileges:
Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene
the fundamental principle that the public . . . has a right
to every man’s evidence. As such, they must be strictly
construed and accepted only to the very limited extent that
permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant
evidence has a public good transcending the normally
Not only did the Cox court fail to address the applicable federal statutory
guidelines, the court also failed to address the primary Supreme Court
decision that limits judicial involvement in the creation or expansion of
evidentiary privileges. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)
(admonishing federal courts to narrowly construe evidentiary privileges).
Furthermore, the Cox court made no indication whatsoever as to the standard
of review the court was applying. See generally Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787.
136
445 U.S. 40 (1980).
137
Prior to 1980, Hawkins v. United States was the controlling case with
respect to the federally established spousal privilege. Trammel, 445 U.S. at
41, 42 (calling for a re-examination of Hawkins); see also Hawkins, 358 U.S.
74 (1958). In Hawkins, the Court acknowledged the longstanding common-law
rule that husbands and wives were incompetent to testify either for or against
one another. Id. at 74, 75. The Court then pointed out that Funk v. United
States had altered the common law rule somewhat by allowing spouses to
testify for each other. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76; see also Funk, 290 U.S. 371
(1933). The Hawkins Court stated, however, that Funk did not alter the rule
that spouses could not testify against one another. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 76.
Upholding this rule and refusing to distinguish between compelled and
voluntary testimony, the Court held that in the interest of protecting the
sanctity of marriage, one spouse would not be permitted to testify even
voluntarily against the other. Id. Despite government arguments that a
marriage involving a spouse willing to testify against the other was already
doomed, the Court refused to allow government action to catalyze divorce and
stated that “adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings would, we think,
be likely to destroy almost any marriage.” Id. at 78. Noting both the state
legislative trend of altering the spousal privilege to allow spouses to
voluntarily testify against one another and the accepted state practice of
offering a spouse immunity from prosecution for testifying against the other
spouse, the Trammel Court modified Hawkins to allow spouses to voluntarily
testify against one another. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
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predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining the truth.138
Not only did the Cox opinion fail to address the Trammel
decision, the district court also ignored the principle adopted
therein by the Supreme Court. Had the district court made any
effort to “strictly construe[]” New York’s religious privilege as
Trammel requires,139 it could not have determined that the
members of A.A. qualify as clergy. Even ignoring other
jurisdictions’ applications of the privilege, which might also have
persuaded the court to alter its course, it would be difficult to
argue that the New York legislature would consider A.A.
members clergy when it expressly requires Christian Science
practitioners to be “duly accredited” for the privilege to apply.140
Rather than follow legislative limitations and realism to their
logical ends, however, the district took it upon itself to ordain
more than a million unsuspecting A.A. members.141
4. Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole
The Cox court applied Carmona in an effort to circumvent the
statutory requirement that the person with whom the
communication is made be a “clergyman, or other minister of
any religion or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner.”142
This requirement, however, is not completely ignored. The
district court satisfied itself by finding, without explanation, that
members of A.A. are “ordained by the Twelve Steps” and that
“all members exercise the office of clergyman.”143 Thus, the
court found that the Establishment Clause, which at a minimum
138

Id. at 50.
Id. Trammel requires federal courts to consider whether expanding the
particular privilege would serve a “public good transcending the normally
predominant principle” of discovering the truth. Id. This note concludes that
expanding the religious privilege to speech within A.A. causes more public
harm than good.
140
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001).
141
See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members).
142
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001).
143
Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
139
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prohibits the government from preferring one religion over
another, requires the religious privilege to apply to A.A. just as it
applies to the “traditionally recognized forms” of religion.144
The Cox court characterizes A.A. members as clergy in order
to apply the religious privilege, yet fails to clearly elucidate its
rationale for doing so.145 Like a parent arguing with a child, the
court supports its position with an unarticulated, “because I said
so.” Any effort to explain further would have revealed the
court’s unjustifiable reasoning. The court proceeds as follows:
(1) assuming a communication occurs with the requisite
reasonable expectation of confidentiality, the religious privilege
protects communication with a Catholic priest acting in his
professional capacity;146 (2) the government cannot show a
preference for Catholicism, a “traditional” form of religion, over
A.A., an organization newly designated as religious;147 therefore,
(3) the religious privilege must apply to A.A.148
Viewed separately, each point lacks controversy. The first,
however, that the privilege applies to a priest acting in his

144

Id. Interestingly, the Cox court notes that “it is possible as a matter of
Constitutional law to have and to practice a religion without having a
clergyman as such, or where all members exercise the office of clergyman . .
. .” Id. at 787. Although this might be correct, research has yet to reveal any
statute granting the religious privilege or any court applying the religious
privilege when the communication concerned someone who was not a member
of the clergy. The religious privilege, therefore, should not apply when the
religion recognizes no spiritual leaders. Perhaps this is why the Cox court
determined, without hinting to its rationale, that A.A. falls into the latter
category. Id. Even if the court had offered an explanation, it would still be
hard pressed to find support for its assumption that the privilege would apply
to all members of a religion that viewed each member as clergy. See In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 n.13 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[W]e do
not intimate that the privilege should be interpreted to comprehend
communications to and among members of sects that denominate each and
every member as clergy.”).
145
See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
146
Id. at 790 (noting that the New York statutory privilege “has its
historical origin in the Roman Catholic church”).
147
Id. at 792.
148
Id.
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professional capacity, does not lead logically to the second, that
the privilege applies to a particular religion. Rather, the first
point demonstrates that the privilege applies to communication
with a particular individual who is recognized by a religious
institution as one qualified to offer spiritual advice.149 In other
words, the fact that the privilege would apply to qualified
communication with a priest demonstrates the religious
privilege’s individual applicability. Communication with a
Catholic priest is protected, as is communication with a cleric
within the Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim religions.150 To then
conclude the privilege applies to Catholicism, Protestantism,
Judaism and Islam and, therefore, must apply to A.A. without
reference to anyone recognized by A.A. as a spiritual advisor
converts the privilege from a principle applying individually to
one having an organizational application. If this were true, the
privilege would expand uncontrollably, applying not only to the
priest, but also to the church secretary or perhaps even to
communication between two parishioners. This not only defeats
the limiting principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Trammel,
but it also diminishes the authority of the fifty state legislatures,
each of which have adopted a definition of clergy that requires
more than a mere desire to lend a sympathetic ear.151
149

All of the statutory religious privileges apply to persons within
religions, not religions categorically. See supra note 3 (citing state statutes
conferring the religious privilege).
150
See supra note 1 (discussing legislative attempts to enumerate the
leaders of religions to whom the religious privilege would apply).
151
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (Deering 2001) (defining clergy as
“a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or
of a religious denomination or religious organization”); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
52-146b (2001) (limiting Connecticut’s privilege to confidential
communication with “a clergyman, priest, minister, rabbi or practitioner of
any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to which he
belongs who is settled in the work of the ministry”); OR. REV. STAT. §
40.260 (2001) (defining a clergy member as “a minister of any church,
religious denomination or organization or accredited Christian Science
practitioner who in the course of the discipline or practice of that church,
denomination or organization is authorized or accustomed to hearing
confidential communications and, under the discipline or tenets of that church,
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Judicial interpretations of the religious privilege also support
the notion that more is needed for a person to qualify as clergy.152
Although they have been unwilling to identify any specific
requirements, courts should limit the application of the religious
denomination or organization, has a duty to keep such communications
secret”).
152
In In re Verplank, a California district court found that communication
between college students and counselors qualified for the religious privilege.
329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Calif. 1971). A minister ordained by the United
Presbyterian Church who had been hired to counsel students regarding the
Vietnam draft had recruited non-ordained counselors to assist him with what
became an overly burdensome task. Id. at 434-36. To determine whether the
privilege protected communication between the students and the non-ordained
counselors, the court looked to the advisory committee’s notes for proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 506 and found that the non-ordained counselors’
work conformed sufficiently with that of an ordained minister of an
“established Protestant denomination to the extent necessary to bring [the
counselors] within the privilege covering communication to clergymen.” Id.;
see also PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 84. In
Rutledge v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana refused to apply the privilege
when the communication in question occurred between an inmate and a
member of the Gideons, an organization of businessmen who passed out
Bibles. 525 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. 1988). The Gideon member in this case
regularly spoke with inmates about the Bible and “being forgiven for their
sins.” Id. at 327. The makeup of the organization and the fact that it was not
affiliated with any church were the chief factors persuading the court that the
privilege was inapplicable. Id. at 328. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in
Reutkemeier v. Nolte, determined that confidential communication with the
elders of a Presbyterian church was privileged. 161 N.W. 290 (Iowa 1917).
The elders, the court found, held a position within the church equal to that of
the minister, who was also an elder. Id. at 292-94. Elected by the members of
the congregation, the church elders were together responsible for governing
the church affairs and were often called to carry out duties of the minister
when no acknowledged minister was available. Id. at 293. These
characteristics proved persuasive. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court later refused to
apply the privilege to communications that transpired between a criminal
defendant and his brother, despite the defendant’s claim that he looked to his
brother for spiritual guidance. See State v. Alspach, 524 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa
1994). The court found that the brother did not qualify as clergy, regardless of
the defendant’s perceptions. Id. at 668; see also Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d
779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a self-proclaimed psychic was not
a member of the clergy as defined by Georgia’s religious privilege).
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privilege to situations involving a cleric who is recognized by the
religious organization to which that person belongs as one
qualified to provide spiritual guidance.153
Perhaps recognizing this, the Cox court was compelled by its
desired outcome to determine that A.A. members are clergy.154
Again, this conclusion ignores many of A.A.’s defining
characteristics. The central A.A. organization recognizes no
leaders.155 A.A. has no formal structure other than its services

153

See, e.g., Reutkemeier, 161 N.W. at 292-94 (examining the literature
and doctrine of the Presbyterian Church to determine if the church viewed the
elders as clergy to whom the religious privilege applies). Furthermore, such a
requirement is implied by the various statutory definitions of spiritual
advisors. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (2001) (defining “clergyman” as
“any duly ordained, licensed or commissioned minister, pastor, priest, rabbi
or practitioner of any bona fide established church or religious organization
and shall include and be limited to any person who regularly, as a vocation,
devotes a substantial portion of his time and abilities to the service of his
respective church or religious organization”); HAW. R. EVID. 506 (2001) (“A
member of the clergy is a minister, priest, rabbi, Christian Science
practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious organization . . . .”);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2001) (defining clergy as “a clergyman or
practitioner of any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to
which he or she belongs”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (McKinney 2001) (requiring,
for purposes of the religious privilege, Christian Science practitioners to be
“duly accredited”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (2001) (prohibiting a “duly
ordained minister of the gospel, priest, or rabbi” from revealing confidential
communications).
154
The Cox court’s grossly inaccurate description of A.A. and its holding
without reasoning that A.A. members are “ordained” by the Twelve Steps
lead to this observation. See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Cox court’s factual findings with
respect to A.A.’s relationship with its members).
155
See supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s ninth tradition, which allows for the
creation of “service boards or committees”); see also The A.A. Group,
pamphlet P-16, at 23 (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1990)
(describing the members of these committees as “officers” who are “usually .
. . chosen by the group for limited terms of service. As Tradition Two
reminds us, ‘Our leaders are but trusted servants; they do not govern.’ These
jobs may have titles. But titles in A.A. do not bring authority or honor; they
describe services and responsibilities.”).
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board,156 no requirements for either individual members or the
groups’ internal leaders other than the desire to recover from
alcoholism,157 no training of any sort for anyone within the
organization,158 and, most importantly, no recognition by the
organization of any individual in a position to provide
counseling, spiritual or otherwise, other than to offer personal
experience to help guide others to sobriety.159 It is clear,
156

See TWELVE STEPS

AND

TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 146-

49.
157

Supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s third tradition). Although A.A. suggests
that a member wishing to sponsor another alcoholic first attain several months
of sobriety, there are, in fact, no requirements or restrictions with respect to
who can become a sponsor. See Questions and Answers on Sponsorship,
pamphlet P-15, at 10 (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services, Inc., 1983).
“There is no superior class or caste of sponsors in A.A. Any member can help
the newcomer learn to cope with life without resorting to alcohol in any
form.” Id. at 13.
158
Id. at 10.
An A.A. sponsor does not provide any such services as those offered
by a social worker, a doctor, a nurse, or a marriage counselor. A
sponsor is simply a sober alcoholic who helps the newcomer solve
one problem: how to stay sober.
And it is not professional training that enables a sponsor to give
help—it is just personal experience and observation.
Id.
159

Id. A.A. has grown through the years partly as a result of its founders’
belief that once A.A. members achieve sobriety, they should help others reach
the same goal. See supra note 41 (stating A.A.’s twelfth step). This method
evolved into what A.A. now refers to as “sponsorship.” See generally
Questions and Answers on Sponsorship, supra note 157. A.A. describes
sponsorship as “an alcoholic who has made some progress in the recovery
program shar[ing] that experience on a continuous, individual basis with
another alcoholic who is attempting to attain or maintain sobriety through
A.A.” Id. at 7. At first glance, the support provided by a sponsor may appear
to parallel that of a clergy member. The guidance sponsors provide, however,
is severely curtailed by two limiting factors. Sponsors receive no formal
training whatsoever in either alcohol recovery or spiritual matters. Id. And,
although sponsors may share the same end—sobriety—their spiritual beliefs
may differ greatly from those to whom they provide help, as membership
mandates only the desire to stop drinking and does not depend on any
particular religious beliefs. See supra note 44 (stating A.A.’s third tradition).
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therefore, that an A.A. member is not qualified by A.A. to
provide spiritual guidance.160 Furthermore, since A.A.
membership requires neither sobriety nor adherence to the
Twelve Steps, finding that A.A. members are somehow ordained
is puzzling, to say the least.161
The Cox decision must falter beneath the weight of appellate
level scrutiny. Its perception of A.A. is misguided at best, as is
its interpretation of the New York Court of Appeals’ Carmona
decision.162 These initial misunderstandings and an obviously
scattered rationale led the district court to ordain A.A. members,
burdening them with an unsolicited privilege, the breadth of
which now conflicts with Supreme Court and state legislative
dictates.
B. A Legal Crack in A.A.’s Foundation
The impact the Cox decision will have on A.A. members
should give any advocate of A.A. and similar groups cause for
concern. First, the Cox court erects yet another barrier between
Sponsors are struggling with their own sobriety and are under no obligation to
work through the Twelve Steps before sponsoring another member, though
A.A. does encourage sponsors to first become sober. Questions and Answers
on Sponsorship, supra note 157, at 13-14. Yet, no matter how long a sponsor
may be sober, A.A. recognizes that even sponsors, by the very nature of
alcoholism, are at risk of slipping from sobriety. See, e.g., TWELVE STEPS
AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 113-14 (discussing the danger of
relapse that accompanies many of life’s disappointments). The organization,
therefore, incorporates what it calls the “24-hour plan,” which reminds
alcoholics of their powerlessness and discourages even members who have
long been sober from making claims of future sobriety. This is AA, supra note
50, at 14. The “24-hour plan” encourages members to focus only on staying
sober for the next twenty-four hours. Id.
160
A situation where an individual A.A. group looks to a particular
member as a spiritual leader would serve as a better example of when the
religious privilege might apply. Nonetheless, the district court in Cox did not
limit its opinion to particular cases. See generally Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp.
2d 787 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
161
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 139.
(“The only requirement for A.A. membership is a desire to stop drinking.”).
162
People v. Carmona, 627 N.E.2d 959 (N.Y. 1993).
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alcoholics and active participation in society, which is already
complicated by the unpopular social stigma accompanying
alcoholism.163 It accomplishes this by forcing upon them a
“privilege” that prevents A.A. members from testifying to
information gained within the A.A. setting and precludes law
enforcement from utilizing any information provided voluntarily
by A.A. members.164 Thus, A.A. members are prohibited from
carrying out duties commonly associated with being a good
citizen.165 Second, the court creates what some jurisdictions have
deemed a fiduciary relationship,166 the breach of which can result
163

TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 184-87
(stating that part of the reason anonymity is so important to members is a fear
of the social stigma that might be attached); see also Understanding
Anonymity, supra note 118, at 5-6 (discussing the need for anonymity).
164
Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 792-93 (holding that the evidence gathered
from the information the A.A. members provided should have been
suppressed).
165
See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980) (“The
citizen’s duty to raise the hue and cry and report felonies to the authorities was
an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as early as the 13th
Century.”) (internal quotations omitted); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 59 (1957) (noting that the government’s ability to conceal an informer’s
identity is necessary in light of citizens’ duty “to communicate their
knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials”); United
States v. Jefferson, 252 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[C]itizens have an
obligation to communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law
enforcement officials.”); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1020 (11th
Cir. 1987) (noting “the duty that is imposed upon all citizens to report
criminal activity”); United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1968)
(“It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever
information they may have to aid in law enforcement.”) (quoting Miranda v.
State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966)) (internal quotations omitted).
But see United States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 1991)
(“It is well established that a person who sees a crime being committed has no
legal duty to either stop it or report it.”).
166
See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
“fiduciary or confidential relation” as broadly “embracing . . . technical
fiduciary relations and . . . informal relations which exist wherever one person
trusts in or relies upon another” and stating that “[s]uch relationship arises
whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and influence
result on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic, or merely
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in civil liability.167 Consequently, the Cox court has determined
personal”).
167
By determining that A.A. members are clergy, the Cox court also sets
a precedent for other jurisdictions to impose civil liability on either A.A.
members whose breach of confidentiality is considered a breach of a fiduciary
duty or possibly on A.A. itself. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430-32 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the
trial court’s finding of a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the
Diocese and holding that the First Amendment does not bar claims against
religious organizations for breach of fiduciary duties); Sanders v. Casa View
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the First
Amendment does not bar claims against clergy for either malpractice or breach
of fiduciary duties); Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1061-62 (N.D. Iowa
1999) (stating that whether a spiritual counselor has a legally cognizable
fiduciary duty “depends upon factual circumstances, not upon professional
standards of conduct for the average reasonable member of the clergy” and
holding that breach of fiduciary duty claims against clergy are not “barred ab
initio” ).
Although these cases arise in the context of claims of sexual abuse, at
least one court has acknowledged the possibility of a duty arising from a
breach of confidentiality. See F.G. v. MacDonnell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997).
The plaintiff in F.G. brought claims against a church rector and his assistant.
Id. at 699-700. Like the courts above, the claim against the church rector
arose from allegations of sexual misconduct. Id. at 700. The claim against the
rector’s assistant, also a member of the clergy, however, concerned a letter he
published detailing the facts of the relationship between the plaintiff and the
rector and circulated to the members of the congregation. Id. The plaintiff
claimed she had revealed the details to the assistant rector in confidence. Id. at
701. The court held that, generally, the First Amendment does not bar a claim
against a clergy member for breach of fiduciary duties. Id. at 703. Thus, the
court upheld the claim against the rector for breach of fiduciary duties with
respect to the sexual relationship. Id. at 705. Furthermore, the F.G. court held
that the claim against the assistant for breach of confidentiality would stand if
the trial court could determine the existence of a breach by referring to
nonreligious, “neutral principles.” Id. But see Lann v. Davis, 793 So. 2d 463,
465-66 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a claim against a clergy member for
breach of fiduciary duty equated to a claim for clergy malpractice and, as
such, was barred by First Amendment); Teadt v. Lutheran Church Mo.
Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 822-24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to create a
fiduciary duty for clergy, stating that such a duty would be impossible to
define); Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (N.Y. 2001) (holding
that New York’s religious privilege did not create a fiduciary duty); Langford
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. App.
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that alcoholic criminals who wish to unburden their souls have a
greater right to recover from their affliction than do those
alcoholics in whom the criminals wish to confide. Cox allows
alcoholics to reveal their criminal secrets to fellow alcoholics
who might not be psychologically capable of maintaining a
relationship requiring confidentiality.168 This could prove
instrumental to recovering criminals, whose unburdened
consciences are free to focus on remaining sober, yet detrimental
to recovering confidants.169 Thus, Cox turns on its head the
principle that those who fail to live by society’s standards
sacrifice their interests in freedom to forward the interests of the

Div. 2000) (holding that the First Amendment barred claims against clergy for
breach of fiduciary duties, which the court equated to malpractice); Hawkins
v. Trinity Baptist Church, 30 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that
the First Amendment barred courts from establishing a fiduciary duty owed by
clergy members).
168
See Cox, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 790. The facts of Cox demonstrate the
plausibility of an A.A. confidant who is unable to carry the burden of
confidentiality encouraged by A.A. Id. Ms. H, struggling with what Mr. Cox
had told her, felt compelled to reveal the information to her own psychologist.
Id. Thus, it follows that if the criminal A.A. member divulges criminal secrets
to a non-criminal A.A. member precluded by law from revealing this
information, the criminal A.A. member is, arguably, benefited by
unburdening his soul while the non-criminal A.A. member must bear the
weight of harboring knowledge of the confessor’s crimes. See generally Julie
D. Lane & Daniel M. Wegner, The Cognitive Consequences of Secrecy, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 237 (1995) (discussing the psychological
effects of harboring secrets).
169
As if overcoming alcoholism were not difficult enough, the confidant
struggling with her own sobriety now must either sacrifice her civic duty to
disclose criminal activity or face potential civil liability should she be unable
to carry out the duty created by Cox. See supra note 167 (discussing decisions
finding a clergy fiduciary duty). Such a psychological dilemma may well
undermine the recovering alcoholic’s sobriety. See, e.g., Brady & Sonne,
supra note 125; Sandra A. Brown et al., Severity of Psychosocial Stress and
Outcome of Alcoholism Treatment, 99 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 344, 344-48
(1990) (distinguishing between the effects of severe and mild stress on the
ability of the alcoholic to remain abstinent and finding, inter alia, that
alcoholics who relapsed after treatment had experienced more severe stress
than the subjects who did not relapse); McKay, supra note 125, at 566.
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non-criminals in attaining a crime-free society.170 Public policy
cannot support the proposition that criminals have a superior
interest in sobriety than non-criminals.171
By expanding the religious privilege to communication within
A.A., the Cox court usurped the A.A. member’s control over her
own recovery.172 If Cox is persuasive, A.A. members in
jurisdictions recognizing a spiritual advisor’s fiduciary
relationship will no longer decide for themselves whether to
maintain the confidential relationships encouraged by A.A.173
Largely as a result of A.A.’s unwillingness to apply pressure to
its members and its support of individual autonomy,174 A.A.’s
methods have been “extremely successful internationally,
[resulting in] more than a million members in the United States
alone.”175 Now, the responsibility to maintain confidentiality has
been forced upon them by a decision that is overly confident in
an alcoholic’s ability to maintain both confidentiality and
sobriety.
A person afflicted with the disease of alcoholism always risks

170

Imprisonment is a key method for protecting society from those who
commit criminal acts. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Jail Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/jails.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2002) (stating that the nation’s local jails held 621,149 prisoners in mid-2000);
see also Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics,
http://www.ojp.usdoj. gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2002) (stating
that as of December 31, 2000, 1,381,892 prisoners were under the control of
the federal or state prison systems).
171
Were this not true, the criminal justice system would transmogrify; for
if criminals have a greater interest in sobriety, it follows that they have a
superior interest in liberty as well. See supra note 170 (stating the number of
criminals being held in local jails and state and federal prisons).
172
See supra Part II.A (discussing A.A.’s relationship with its members).
173
See supra note 167 (discussing cases finding a fiduciary duty for
clergy).
174
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 173
(“Neither its General Service Conference, its foundation board, nor the
humblest group committee can issue a single directive to an A.A. member and
make it stick, let alone mete out any punishment.”).
175
Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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drinking again.176 Medical studies on alcoholism have shown that
stress is a major factor contributing to a recovering alcoholic’s
slip from sobriety.177 Of course, every alcoholic is different.
Some may be able to handle a lot of stress.178 Others may slip
easily from sobriety as the result of simple, day-to-day
pressures.179 The act of keeping a secret itself may serve as the
proverbial straw.180 The law has now determined that all
alcoholics within A.A. are capable of coping with the stress of
knowing and not being able to reveal that a fellow member has
committed atrocities for which they have not been held
accountable.181 Prior to Cox, A.A. encouraged confidentiality but
never guaranteed it; therefore confidentiality could never be

176

See, e.g., Billie Jay Sahley & Katherine M. Birkner, Alcoholism and
Its Treatment, TOWNSEND LETTER FOR DOCTORS AND PATIENTS, July 1, 2000,
at 62 (“The greatest majority of alcoholics cannot become social drinkers
again because they tend to relapse into heavy drinking.”).
177
See Brady & Sonne, supra note 125; Brown et al., supra note 169;
McKay, supra note 125.
178
See Brady & Sonne, supra note 125.
179
See id.
180
See Lane & Wegner, supra note 168, at 239.
Thought suppression and intrusive thoughts occur cyclically, each in
response to the other. Secrecy sets the stage for the formation of a
feedback system in which each attempt to suppress the secret
produces intrusive thinking of that very secret, which in turn
engenders increased efforts at thought suppression. This process can
quickly turn into a self-sustaining cycle in which obsessive
preoccupation with thoughts of the secret develops. Once this
preoccupation cycle is set into motion, moreover, removing secrecy
from the equation will not necessarily stop the obsessive
preoccupation with the secret. After the person has identified the
thought of a secret as intrusive and unwanted, suppression can
maintain the intrusiveness (and the intrusiveness can maintain the
suppression). Secrecy’s cognitive consequences may persevere long
after the secrecy itself is gone.
Id.
181
Supra note 168 (discussing the potential psychological impact the Cox
decision could have on non-criminal alcoholics attempting to recover through
A.A.).
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reasonably expected.182 That fact by itself should preclude
expanding the religious privilege to A.A.183
The law now, in effect, demands that members of A.A.
guarantee confidentiality and, as a result, has determined that the
criminal’s interest in sobriety supercedes that of the non-criminal
A.A. member.184 Public policy cannot tolerate such a distortion
of the legal system. It is also quite possible that A.A., as it has
existed since 1939, will be unable to tolerate the pressure now
being applied as a matter of law. This result would certainly
prove harmful to society’s interests, contravening both utilitarian
principles185 and Supreme Court precedent.186 Applying the
182

Not only would the Constitution leave the law powerless to force a
religion to guarantee confidentiality, but the fact that a person in such a
situation could have no expectation of confidentiality also would mandate
against applying the religious privilege, which requires just such an
expectation. See United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971)
(upholding the trial court’s decision to admit into evidence an inmate’s letter to
a priest when the letter contained no indication that it was meant to remain
confidential).
183
Although the parameters of the privilege vary somewhat from state to
state, each statute granting the privilege requires an expectation of
confidentiality. See supra note 3 (listing the state statutes).
184
See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
185
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir.
1990) (“[T]he privilege protecting communications to members of the clergy,
like the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges, is grounded in a policy
of preventing disclosures that would tend to inhibit the development of
confidential relationships that are socially desirable.”); see also J.S. MILL,
UTILITARIANISM 55 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1863)
(“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”).
In his introductory analysis of Mill’s work, Roger Crisp summarizes the
Greatest Happiness Principle by explaining that “the ultimate end is the
greatest balance of pleasure over pain, to be assessed by competent judges.
This being the end of human action, it is also the end of morality, which
consists of those rules that will best further the end.” Id. at 37. John Henry
Wigmore’s four criteria for protecting confidential communications, discussed
infra Part III, which have been applied in numerous jurisdictions, are
described as utilitarian. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Miss., Inc. v.
Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981) (“This Court adopted Wigmore’s
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religious privilege to A.A. communication, therefore, is
unsupported by both law and public policy.
III. RESPONDING TO CRITICS
Supporters of expanding the religious privilege to A.A.
generally invoke Dean Wigmore’s criteria for recognizing an
evidentiary privilege.187 They also argue that A.A. members
essentially function as clergy and, therefore, deserve similar
treatment.188 Finally, some have expressed concern that without
the protection of the religious privilege A.A. will suffer by
becoming an easily accessible law enforcement tool.189 While this
classic utilitarian formulation of the conditions for recognition of a testimonial
privilege in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).”);
Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Group, 198 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Me. 2000) (stating
that when determining whether information is privileged “this court must
consider Wigmore’s classic utilitarian formulation”); see also Developments in
the Law: Privileged Communications: II. Modes of Analysis: The Theories and
Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1472
(1985) (describing Wigmore’s criteria as “essentially utilitarian” and
describing the utilitarian approach as “assert[ing] that communications made
within a given relation should be privileged only if the benefit derived from
protecting the relation outweighs the detrimental effect of the privilege on the
search for truth”). Wigmore was dean of faculty at Northwestern University
School of Law from 1901 to 1929. WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE 45-184 (1977). His treatise on evidence, which laid the foundation
for modern evidentiary law, was first published in 1904 and “was promptly
recognized as an outstanding publication . . . .” Id. at 77. “[A]nd Wigmore
quickly rose from the rank of a promising but somewhat obscure scholar and
teacher to the rating of one of the great masters of the law.” Id. at 79 (inner
quotations omitted).
186
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40 (1980)).
187
See generally Reed, supra note 30; Weiner, supra note 30.
188
See generally Reed, supra note 30; Weiner, supra note 30.
189
See Jimmy Breslin, Without a Shield, A.A. May Not Survive,
NEWSDAY, June 14, 1994, at A2 (quoting an A.A. member, identified only as
a priest, as stating after Mr. Cox’s conviction, “As I understand it, they
subpoenaed people for a double homicide. That’s rare. But once you make
Alcoholics Anonymous people talk about one thing, what is to stop the
authorities from deciding that they can come around for anything, an income
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fear is not entirely irrational, expanding the religious privilege is
excessive and ultimately unnecessary in light of the constitutional
protection afforded all religious organizations.
A. Dean Wigmore’s Criteria Fail to Support Protecting A.A.
Communication
Dean Wigmore identified four criteria he viewed as necessary
to establish an evidentiary privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation.190
In the A.A. context, however, attempting to apply the four
criteria requires a level of speculation that could not be tolerated
in light of the public policy argument discussed in Part II. First,
whether an expectation of confidentiality can exist within A.A. is
highly uncertain.191 The organization imposes no consequences on

tax case.”). Another rationale proffered is that the information conveyed in
A.A. and similar self-help settings is protected by the penumbral right to
privacy. See Reed, supra note 30, at 746-51; Weiner, supra note 30, at 26770.
190
8 J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
191
As has already been noted, A.A. has no authority over its members,
who are free to follow or dismiss A.A.’s suggestions. See TWELVE STEPS AND
TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 173. “Groups have tried to expel
members, but the banished have come back to sit in the meeting place, saying
‘This is life for us; you can’t keep us out.’” Id. Nowhere in the Twelve Steps
or Twelve Traditions is the word or concept of confidentiality mentioned. See
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individuals for failing to follow its suggestion that communication
be considered confidential.192 Nor should society assume that
alcoholics, by attending A.A. meetings, are willing to subject
themselves to the responsibilities that accompany the confidential
relationship.193
Next, it is unclear whether the expectation of confidentiality
is necessary for the relationships within A.A. to survive.
Although some evidence suggests that people are more honest
when guaranteed confidentiality, A.A. has never guaranteed
confidentiality;194 therefore, it cannot be argued that a lack of
such a guarantee would negatively affect A.A.’s membership or
effectiveness.195 In fact, it is equally reasonable to assume that the
members of A.A. require and relish the freedom from the
responsibility of having to harbor the knowledge of the criminal
deeds of another.196 The founders of A.A. recognized the need to
not pressure the alcoholic.197 The law, far less knowledgeable in
such matters, is in no position to determine otherwise.
Regarding the fourth criterion, prohibiting A.A. members
supra note 41 (listing A.A.’s Twelve Steps); see also supra note 44 (listing
A.A.’s Twelve Traditions).
192
TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 173.
193
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing A.A.’s relationship with its
members).
194
See supra note 191 (discussing A.A.’s lack of authority over its
members); see also Alcoholics Anonymous, The Importance of Anonymity, at
http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/english/E_FactFile/M-24_d9.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2002) (“An A.A. member may, for various reasons, ‘break
anonymity’ deliberately at the public level. Since this is a matter of individual
choice and conscience, the Fellowship as a whole obviously has no control
over such deviations from tradition.”).
195
Furthermore, there is equally compelling evidence that some secrets
are better unrevealed. See Anita E. Kelly & Kevin J. McKillop, Consequences
of Revealing Personal Secrets, 120 PSYCHOL. BULL., No. 3, 450-65 (stating
that revealing secrets, which is largely considered therapeutically beneficial,
may actually damage the confessor when the secret revealed causes the
confidant to react negatively).
196
See supra note 191 (discussing A.A.’s lack of authority over its
members).
197
See Twelve STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 32, at 129
(stating that A.A. has no rules).
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from revealing knowledge of criminal behavior would actually
prove harmful to recovering alcoholics, who may be emotionally
unable to handle the burden the religious privilege places on
them. The privilege, therefore, actually injures those the Cox
court may have been trying to protect. Any injury that may result
to the personal relationship between A.A. members can hardly
compare. Compounded with the barrier evidentiary privileges
place between courts and the truth they seek, it is difficult to see
any benefits arising from imposing the religious privilege on
A.A. members.
Ultimately, the third criterion is the only one that survives
analysis. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to argue that
A.A. does not benefit society. Although A.A. keeps no detailed
records of membership, the organization claims to have millions
of members throughout the world.198 Alcoholism is a source of
crime, misery, and physical illness that can lead to selfdestruction and death.199 Likewise, alcoholism poses enormous
economic costs on society.200 Because A.A. reduces those costs
while imposing no realizable social costs of its own, society
should “sedulously foster[]” A.A. and the relationships that
develop therein.201 Nevertheless, the satisfaction of this criterion
alone cannot justify applying the religious privilege to
communications within A.A.202

198

See supra note 25 (noting A.A.’s size in terms of members).
See Jill Neimark et al., Back from the Drink, PSYCHOL.TODAY, Sept.
1994, at 46 (stating that in the United States each year, 40,000 people die
from alcoholism and that alcoholism is implicated in 30% of suicides overall
and 46% of suicides among teenagers).
200
Id. (stating that the monetary costs to the country are $80 billion
annually).
201
Id.; see also J.H. WIGMORE, supra note 190, at § 2285.
202
J.H. WIGMORE, supra note 190, at § 2285.
Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be
recognized. That they are present in most of the recognized privileges
is plain enough; and the absence of one or more of them serves to
explain why certain privileges have failed to obtain the recognition
sometimes demanded for them.
Id.
199
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B. Courts Do Not Adhere to the Functionalist Approach203
Commentators also argue that the religious privilege should
apply to A.A. based on the purpose A.A. members serve each
other.204 Since A.A. members provide essentially the same
service as clergy members, the argument goes, A.A. members
should enjoy a similar right to privileged communication.205 In
addition to the myriad reasons why A.A. members are not the
equivalent of clergy,206 the functionalist approach, in light of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Trammel, suffers from a more obvious
deficiency—the proverbial slippery slope. That is to say,
accompanying the functionalist rationale is the potential for
burdensome litigation seeking to further expand the privilege.
For example, litigants have already tried to argue—
unsuccessfully—that the religious privilege applies to a psychic or
to family members to whom a person may look for spiritual
guidance.207 If the religious privilege did apply to such
relationships, one could then argue, for example, that the lawyerclient privilege should apply to a criminal seeking legal advice
from a bail bondsman. Such arguments would burden the courts
tremendously by forcing them to create exceptions in order to
administer justice, when, as Trammel clarifies, the administration
of justice is the rule and protected communication the

203

See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 734
(defining “Functionalism” as follows: “(1) The doctrine that the function of an
object should determine its design and materials; (2) A doctrine stressing
purpose, practicality, and utility.”).
204
See Reed, supra note 30, at 737 (analogizing A.A. members and
clergy); Weiner, supra note 30, at 270-72 (discussing “the functionalist
rationale” for extending the religious privilege to A.A.).
205
See supra note 204 (citing commentators proffering this view).
206
See supra Part II.4 (distinguishing A.A. members from members of
the clergy).
207
See Manous v. State, 407 S.E.2d 779, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the religious privilege did not apply to communication between a
criminal defendant and his psychic); State v. Alspach, 524 N.W.2d 665, 668
(Iowa 1994) (holding that a criminal defendant’s brother did not qualify as
clergy despite defendant’s view of his brother as a spiritual advisor).
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exception.208
C. Extending the Privilege Is Unnecessary
Finally, creating explicit legal protection for speech within
A.A., although already shown to violate public policy, is a
drastic and unnecessary solution to a problem not yet proven to
exist. In addition to the utilitarian and functionalist positions
discussed,209 some believe that the Cox trial exemplifies the abuse
that will result without the privilege.210 Although Ms. H
voluntarily approached the district attorney to reveal the
information Mr. Cox had told her, the others within Mr. Cox’s
A.A. group were forced to testify.211 Critics arguing for
application of the religious privilege to A.A. claim that such a
measure is necessary to prevent prosecutors from abusing their
position by subpoenaing A.A. members and compromising A.A.
confidentiality.212 Yet, in their haste, these critics forget about
Ms. H and other A.A. members whose dedication to maintaining
the confidential relationships encouraged by A.A. is secondary to
their psychological well-being.213 Furthermore, the six-and-ahalf-year interim between Mr. Cox’s conviction, which was
reported nationwide,214 and his grant of habeas corpus offered no
208

See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40 (1980)).
209
See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing and dismissing the various
rationales for extending the religious privilege to communication within
A.A.).
210
See supra note 189 (noting the alarmist concern that failure to protect
communication within A.A. will result in the organization’s demise).
211
See Reed, supra note 30, at 700 (stating that the Cox conviction was
the first incident where A.A. members were compelled to testify).
212
See supra note 189 (noting the alarmist concern that failure to protect
communication within A.A. will result in the organization’s demise).
213
Cox v. Miller, 154 F. Supp. 2d 787, at 790 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating
that Ms. H first revealed to her psychologist the information Mr. Cox had told
her).
214
See, e.g., Geraldine Baum, Whether in a Support Group, Therapy or
Church, People Seek Comfort in Anonymous Confession, L.A. TIMES, June
24, 1994, at E1; Editorial, Confidentiality Not Guaranteed in All Kinds of

BARRYMACRO7-11FINAL.DOC

7/24/02 11:13 AM

SILENCE VERSUS SOBRIETY

485

indication that the critics’ concerns of overzealous, encroaching
prosecutors are remotely realistic.215
Nevertheless, the possibility of a situation like Cox arising
again is not beyond comprehension, and the social benefits A.A.
confers certainly weigh in favor of protecting those A.A.
members who view confidentiality as fundamental to their
recovery.216 Clearly, extending the religious privilege to A.A.
risks compromising the spirit of freedom and autonomy ingrained
in nearly every aspect of one of the world’s most successful selfhelp organizations.217 Conversely, absent the privilege, A.A.
members remain free from the pressures the privilege creates,
free to focus on becoming and remaining sober and, if they so
choose, free to preserve the confidential, anonymous
relationships encouraged by A.A.218 Assuming the Second and
Seventh Circuit decisions recognizing twelve step programs as
religious organizations are upheld and found persuasive
elsewhere,219 the Constitution will protect A.A. members from
abusive law enforcement.220
Therapy Sessions, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 18, 1994, at 14A; Bruce
Frankel, Drunken Stupor Turns Deadly/A.A. Confession Raises Questions of
Confidentiality, USA TODAY, June 8, 1994, at 2A; Jan Hoffman, Faith in
Confidentiality of Therapy Is Shaken, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1994, at A1.
215
See Reed, supra note 30, at 700 (stating that the Cox conviction was
the first incident where A.A. members were compelled to testify). Research
has thus far uncovered no other cases where A.A. members were forced to
testify or where law enforcement officials were accused of infiltrating A.A.
meetings.
216
See supra Part III.A (discussing Dean Wigmore’s criteria for
establishing an evidentiary privilege).
217
See supra Part I.A (discussing the history of A.A.).
218
See supra note 118 (discussing the theory behind A.A.’s principle of
anonymity).
219
See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir.
1996); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
220
See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718 (“The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
state interest.”); see also, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1972)
(holding that the state could not compel defendants, Amish parents, to send
their children to school past the eighth grade when such practice violated their
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The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution prevents courts
from compelling A.A. members to testify with respect to
information revealed in the practice of their “religion.”221 This is
true to the extent that the government has no compelling interest
and cannot accomplish its ends through a means tailored to
protect fundamental First Amendment rights.222 In Wisconsin v.
Yoder, the Supreme Court stated, “Only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”223 Relying on
the Constitution will not only protect A.A. members in a fashion
similar to the religious privilege, but it also will protect those
A.A. members who long to be free from the restraints the
religious privilege imposes.224
religious beliefs).
221
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see supra note 53 (discussing cases equating
A.A. with religion).
222
See supra note 220 (citing cases discussing government infringement
of the free exercise of religion).
223
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
224
Obviously, not every member is dedicated to the principle of
confidentiality within A.A. That is not to say that no A.A. members adhere to
a self-imposed obligation to maintain the confidential relationship out of a
belief that it is fundamental to the practice of A.A.’s Twelve Steps and Twelve
Traditions. In Thomas, the Supreme Court addressed a similar situation. 450
U.S. 707. The plaintiff in Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness who had been
employed in the steel industry. Id. at 710. Originally, he had been involved in
the fabrication of sheet steel. Id. But when the company he worked for closed
his division, Mr. Thomas was transferred to a division requiring him to
participate in the manufacturing of tank turrets for the military. Id. According
to Mr. Thomas, his religion would not permit him to contribute directly to the
manufacture of armaments, though he felt that he could be involved in the
production of materials that may find their way to military use more
indirectly. Id. at 711. Not all within his religion were in agreement. Id. at
710. A fellow Jehovah’s Witness had told Mr. Thomas that working on
weapons did not violate his religion’s doctrine. Id. Mr. Thomas was
nonetheless convinced, and his convictions caused him to ask to be laid off.
Id. When this request was refused, he quit and sought unemployment benefits.
Id. The matter found its way to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which held that
a denial of benefits did not violate the Free Exercise Clause when the belief
claimed to have been infringed was nothing more than a “personal
philosophical choice.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Cox opinion will not likely be affirmed on
appeal and Mr. Cox will remain in prison to pay for his crimes,
the district court’s bewildering decision provides a glimpse of
what the future may hold for A.A. and other groups adopting the
Twelve Steps. The legal system seems increasingly intent on
viewing A.A. as a sectarian organization.225 While the Warner
and Farrey decisions arguably are the grossest examples of the
establishment of religion, they seem less so when confined to
their facts.226 Although the Second Circuit in Warner
distinguished between the religious events at A.A. and a prayer
at a high school graduation, it would be wise for the court to
readdress this aspect and reconsider its position.227 Analogizing
A.A. meetings that incorporate religious aspects with a public
school attempting to incorporate a prayer would result in less
confusion while reaching the identical end sought, preventing the
government from endorsing religion in the broadest sense of the

Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. 1979). Reversing the Indiana court’s
decision, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that it was not necessary for Mr.
Thomas’ belief to comport with the beliefs of other Jehovah’s Witnesses for
his belief to rise to a religious status. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715, 716.
Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers
of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill
equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion
Clauses. One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so
clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection
under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and the
guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by
all of the members of a religious sect.
Id.
225
See supra Part I.B (discussing the gradual judicial perception of A.A.
as a religious organization despite A.A.’s contrary position and its provision
of interpretive guidance for atheist members).
226
See Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir.
1996); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
227
Warner, 115 F.3d at 1076 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), which found that non-sectarian prayer given at a public high school
graduation violated the Establishment Clause).
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word.228
Whether the Second or Seventh Circuits do ultimately limit
their views on this issue, the fact remains that the religious
privilege is inapplicable in the A.A. context.229 Although the
courts may choose to maintain the view that A.A. is a religion, it
should be viewed as a religion without recognized leaders or
spiritual advisors.230 In light of congressional and Supreme Court
limitations on the development of evidentiary privileges and
common sense reading of state religious privileges, unless the
various legislatures decide otherwise, protecting communication
within A.A. should be left to the Constitution’s Free Exercise
Clause. The Cox court chose to ignore Congress and the Supreme
Court, and its application of New York law was disingenuous, to
say the least. Furthermore, its effects could be disastrous for the
millions of people whose very survival depends on A.A. The Cox
opinion should, therefore, serve the legal community not as a
persuasive argument or precedent, but as a mistake not to be
repeated.

228

Weisman, 505 U.S. at 589 (“The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses
mean that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be
either proscribed or prescribed by the State.”).
229
See supra Parts II-III (discussing the numerous reasons why the
religious privilege should not be extended to communication within A.A.).
230
See supra Part II.A.4 (distinguishing between A.A. members and
members of the clergy).

